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Conflict and Adaptation: Identifying the markers of 
cognitive control in the transit ion from wakefulness 
to sleep  
 
This thesis aims to investigate the cognitive changes that follow the transition 
from wakefulness to sleep. All studies presented have been driven by the hypothesis 
that consciousness is selectively required for some cognitive processes and not 
others. As such, fluctuations in alertness are hypothesised expected to produce a 
larger effect in those processes that are more reliant on consciousness.  
In chapter 2 we begin by investigating the effect of alertness on conflict 
monitoring. Conflict monitoring is the environmental scanning process by which 
the brain detects conflicting information and identifies the need for top-down 
behavioural control. Using a combined Go/NoGo and Go-left/Go-right paradigm, 
we investigated effects of alertness on reaction times and responsiveness. We 
revealed an interaction between the task requirement to monitor conflict 
(Go/NoGo) and the level of alertness. Crucially, the difference between both tasks 
was only observed in the later stage of drowsiness. This suggests that conflict 
monitoring is more susceptible to reductions in alertness. 
Our results from Chapter 2 also provide further evidence for the ecological 
validity of the Hori scale as a way to classify of the sleep onset period into 
functionally meaningful sub-stages. However, manual scoring of trials is an arduous 
process subject to interrater variability. In order to overcome these limitations, we 
developed an automated algorithm to classify trials into 3 alertness categories using 
Hori stage principles. This microstaging method was published in the journal 
 v 
Neuroimage (Jahannathan, Ezquerro-Nassar, et al., 2018) and is included in its 
published form. 
The method in Chapter 3 was then employed in Chapters 4 and 5, where we 
investigated effects of alertness and sleep deprivation in an auditory Simon task. This 
research was published in Journal of Neuroscience (Canales-Johnson, et al., 2020) 
and the manuscript is included in this thesis. Participants attended two sessions in 
the lab and performed an auditory Simon task, after a night of normal sleep or a 
night of partial sleep deprivation. We hypothesised that conflict detection processes 
necessary for an immediate conflict effect would be preserved under drowsiness, in 
line with studies showing residual processing for local, short stimuli during early 
sleep. Similarly, we predicted that sleep deprivation would not impair conflict 
detection. 
Furthermore, we investigated the capacity to modify behavioural control 
using information from the previous trial via top-down mechanisms, known as 
conflict adaptation. The process that mediates the conflict adaptation effect is 
hypothesised to require consciousness. Therefore, we hypothesised that trial-by-trial 
conflict adaptation would be impaired during drowsiness and sleep deprivation.  
In Chapter 4, we confirmed our hypothesis that the conflict detection is 
preserved under drowsiness, as indicated by slower reaction times for incongruent 
stimuli. However, we revealed an interaction between alertness, previous trial 
congruency and current trial congruency, suggesting a deleterious effect of 
drowsiness on conflict adaptation. At odds with our hypothesis, sleep deprivation 
was found to have a main effect on reaction times but it did not interact with any of 
the variables. 
In Chapter 5, we found an increase in theta power associated to incongruent 
trials, a classic neural marker of cognitive control. This effect was observed during 
wakefulness but not during drowsiness, suggestive of potential alternative 
mechanisms underlying cognitive control under reduced alertness. 
 vi 
Overall, the findings of this thesis suggest that alertness has a different bearing 
depending on the cognitive process required. This has wider implications for the 
functional role of consciousness and suggests that sleep onset period is a useful 
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1.1 Defining the explanandum: why is the easy 
problem of consciousness so hard? 
 
onsider for a moment the unique situation you find yourself in. The 
experience of being a self, possessing of agency and a sense of freedom, 
located within a world of objects that evoke personal meanings and 
sensations. Maybe some of these objects trigger memories, themselves linked to 
pleasant or painful emotions. This seamless process of association comes effortlessly 
to us in what is referred to as the stream of consciousness. We are blissfully blind to the 
intricate brain process of construction inherent in such subjective experiences, so 
our perceptions of the world present themselves as self-evident. Herein lies the 
danger of confusing the access to our own consciousness with access to the processes 
that give rise to consciousness. Arguably one of the main challenges when devising 
a science of consciousness is the ease with which we end up mistaking our conscious 




The debate around consciousness is murky and plagued with traps of 
intuition. Chalmers (1995) famously distilled the question into the hard and the easy 
problems of consciousness. By easy problems, he was referring to the set of questions 
that can be directly investigated by cognitive scientists, such as the study of 
information integration, the focus of attention, reportability of mental states, the 
differences between wakefulness and sleep, among others. The hard problem of 
consciousness –according to Chalmers— relates to the question of phenomenal 
experience. In his view, explaining how phenomenal consciousness emerges is 
beyond the scope of the scientific method. 
Nonetheless, cognitive neuroscience has pushed forward into the so-called 
easy problems, to the full realisation that they are only easy by comparison. Arguably, 
some of the most difficult challenges are conceptual rather than technical, with no 
shortage of theoretical frameworks for conceptualising consciousness. So far, the 
approach has been to start at the level of subjective experiences and subsequently 
come up with biological theories that can account for the existence of such 
experiences and bridge the so-called “explanatory gap”. This has led to an explosion 
in theories of consciousness (ToCs). Doerig et al. (2020) suggest that such a 
proliferation of theories is due to a lack in criteria about what constitutes a good 
ToC, but nonetheless agree that the processes which give rise to consciousness can 
be studied empirically. Indeed, they argue that is precisely empirical data that should 
be golden standard against which all ToCs are measured against, rather than their 
mere explanatory lure. 
1.2 Content and State: the Yin and Yang of 
Consciousness Science 
 
When Baars (1997) first articulated the Global Workspace Theory (GWT), he 
proposed that brain processes are akin to those of a theatre production, where most 
of the action occurs backstage and only the end product is on display. Going from 
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the assumption that consciousness arises as the result of information integration, 
GWT proposes that unconscious mental events occur at a local level up to the point 
where they become integrated and broadcast into the global workspace, giving rise 
to conscious experience. 
In an effort to operationalise theoretical accounts of consciousness, 
researchers have typically differentiated between contents and levels of consciousness 
(figure 1D). Contents of consciousness closely resemble the philosophical concept 
of qualia, referring to those consciously accessible contents of the mind which are 
accompanied by phenomenal experience. On the other hand, the construct of levels 
of consciousness stems from the idea that consciousness is a graded rather than all-
or-none phenomenon. In this view, sleep, vegetative state, comma, anaesthesia and 
wakefulness are some examples of different levels of consciousness (Overgaard & 
Overgaard, 2010).  
More recently, Bayne et al. (2016) wrote against the conceptual utility of the 
construct of levels of consciousness, arguing that while it might be useful in clinical 
settings to classify consciousness alongside a single dimension, the notion of level 
can lead to problematic conclusions for the science of consciousness. Firstly, they 
argue, the idea of consciousness as graded phenomena seems to rely on the idea that 
level can be attributed on the basis of how vivid or clear the contents of 
consciousness are. However, this is more likely to be a measure of certainty, meaning 
that when a person reports the degree to which they perceived a content, they are in 
fact answering the question “how sure am I that I perceived something?”. An intermediate 
level of certainty then gets equated with an intermediate level of consciousness. 
A suggested alternative is that of conscious states, which differ on the ways in 
which they gate conscious content. Crucially, the notion of a state of consciousness 
does not imply linearity and by allowing states to vary across distinct dimensions 





FIGURE 1. (A-C) SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATIONS SHOWING HYPOTHETICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
DIFFERENT STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS. EACH DIMENSION REPRESENTED BY AN AXIS IS A 
HYPOTHETICAL PLACEHOLDER, TO BE REPLACED BY ANY MEASURE WE WISH TO USE IN 
ORDER TO CHARACTERISE EACH STATE. (A) EXEMPLIFIES A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO 
GLOBAL STATES. (B) COMPARES DIAGNOSES AND OUTCOMES WITHIN A RELATED GLOBAL 
STATE. (C) REPRESENTS THE USE OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK TO CHARACTERISE 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TWO STATES. (D) FRAMEWORK SUGGESTED BY LAUREYS (2005), 
DESCRIBING CONSCIOUSNESS AS A FUNCTION OF TWO DIMENSIONS . FIGURE ADAPTED FROM 
BAYNE., ET AL. (2016) 
  
Image redacted for copyright reasons. Copyright holder is Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
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1.3 What is consciousness for? 
 
The functional question is concerned not with the biological processes that 
give rise to consciousness, but with the function of consciousness itself. In the last 
decades, it has become clear that a wide range of processes can be implemented 
outside of conscious awareness, to the point where it might seem like the existence 
of phenomenal experience is almost redundant. Indeed, in 1874 Thomas Huxley 
argued that consciousness is a biological epiphenomenon, arising merely as a neural 
by-product of evolution with no intrinsic function (Greenwood, 2010).  In this view, 
consciousness is an inevitable result that accompanies certain behaviours but is not 
a necessity for the execution of such behaviours.  
Epiphenomenal accounts of consciousness remain an unlikely possibility but 
are nonetheless difficult to disprove empirically. A more fruitful endeavour in 
cognitive science has been to identify the what functions of consciousness are and 
develop frameworks accordingly. A potential candidate for one of such functions is 
the control volitional action (James, 1890), where voluntary actions are preceded by 
a thought of performing that action. Moreover, those initiated actions can then be 
cancelled by voluntary inhibitory control (a volitional veto), thus exercising apparent 
“free will”. This notion, whilst intuitively appealing, is heavily disputed in the 
literature.  
 Wegner (2004) proposed that the experience of volition comes as the result 
of inferences about mental causation whenever the action satisfies three conditions: 
primacy (the action was immediately preceded by thinking about the action), 
consistency (the action matches the thought), and exclusivity (the thought is the only 
explanation for the action). This view is supported by the existence of conditions 
such as alien hand syndrome, where patients limbs display apparent voluntary 
coordinated action that is nonetheless dissociated from the experience of volition. 
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This suggests that at least the experience of volition can be decoupled from volitional 
action.  
Perhaps a more empirically testable claim about consciousness is that it 
enables flexible, context-dependent behaviour. Evidence suggests that 
consciousness is especially beneficial in the case of procedural learning, and that as 
new skills become integrated into procedural memory they become automated and 
less reliant on conscious access (Schneider, 2003). For example, a person learning to 
cycle might find themselves in their first attempt constantly rehearsing movements 
in their head, internally verbalising rules, and consciously monitoring their actions. 
With time, our cyclist will become less reliant on conscious monitoring and riding 
the bike will become an automatic skill. 
1.4 Consciousness and cognitive control 
 
Cognitive control refers to the ability of the cognitive system to flexibly adapt 
to sudden changes in task demands. It is a general term that encompasses multiple 
psychological processes, closely linked to philosophical notions of volition and free 
will. It has been suggested that some aspects of cognitive control can only be 
performed in the presence of consciousness, which would provide support for the 
view of consciousness as enabling volitional, flexible behaviour. Empirical evidence 
has thus far provided some support for this idea (for a review, see Kunde et al., 
2003).  
However, several forms of cognitive control have been found to occur 
outside of conscious awareness. For instance, Hughes et al. (2009) found that 
nonconscious primes during a Go/NoGo task modulate inhibitory ERP’s, and 
furthermore that the extent of modulation was associated with subsequent 
performance. In another study, Jiang et al. (2015) found that a masked incongruent 
stimulus interfered with the performance in a simple button press task. In other 
words, conflicting information affected task performance and 6ehaviour6 with 
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stimulus processing even when unconsciously presented. A multitude of studies 
have shown similar results in processes such as task-switching (Reuss, et al.., 2011), 
conflict detection (Jiang, et al., 2015), motivation (Aarts, et al., 2008), error detection 
(Cohen, et al., 2009), and attention orienting (Ansorge and Neumann, 2005). 
It has been suggested that the prerequisite of consciousness is determined by 
whether cognitive control is invoked by explicit or implicit events (Kunde et al., 
2003). Explicit events are those where the stimulus contains direct information 
telling the participant what to do.  For instance, in the case of a Go/NoGo task, a 
NoGo cue is explicitly mapped to the instruction that requires execution of 
inhibitory control. Other cases of explicit signalling include task preparation and 
attention orienting.  
On the other hand, implicit events are those where the need for control can 
only be derived by integrating information from more than one explicit event and 
from the wider context of the task. Consider the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), where 
participants are asked to name the colour of the ink in which a word is written while 
ignoring the semantic dimension of the word itself. On average, reaction times are 
longer for incongruent trials (e.g. correctly naming the ink as green when the word 
spells “YELLOW”) than congruent trials (e.g. “GREEN” written in green ink). In 
this case, an implicit event would consist of manipulating an experimental block by 
increasing the frequency of conflict trials. In turn, this would provide information 
that, only if consciously detected, could be used to increase attentional resources and 
improve performance.  
To test this hypothesis, Merikle and Joordens (1997) designed a variant of the 
Stroop task where prior to color stimuli (i.e. the sequence ‘&&&&&&&’ in either 
green or red ink), congruent and incongruent primes (the words ‘GREEN’ and 
‘RED’) were presented either visibly or rendered unconscious by masking. When 
frequency of incongruent trials was increased, the Stroop effect was reversed and 
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participants performed faster for incongruent trials. Crucially, this was only the case 
when the primes were consciously available, but not when primes were masked. 
(Gevers and colleagues (2015) further distinguish between bottom-up and 
top-down components of cognitive control. Bottom-up control is described as the 
“facilitated processing after repetition in responses and/or features of stimuli”, 
whilst top-down components are those which involve “attentional reconfiguration 
on incongruent items.” In order to investigate the effect of sleep deprivation on each 
of these components, they conducted a Stroop task where the words ‘JAUNE’, 
‘VERT’ and ‘ROUGE’ (French for “yellow”, “green” and “red”) where presented 
in either congruent or incongruent colours of ink. Crucially, half of the incongruent 
trials were preceded by the same incongruent stimulus (e.g. ROUGE-ROUGE), and 
the other half of incongruent trials were preceded by a different incongruent stimulus 
(e.g. ROUGE-VERT). They found that a bottom-up effect of repetition was present 
in non-deprived participants, yet persisted after a night of total sleep deprivation, 
indicated by faster responses when the previous trial was incongruent and identical. 
Yet the top-down component of cognitive control was only observed in participants 
who had slept the previous night. This further demonstrated that trial-by-trial 
adaptation can be dissociable depending on the kind of control required.  
1.5 Transitions of consciousness and the breakdown 
of cognition 
 
Since the advent of human electroencephalography (EEG) more than 90 
years ago, it has been recognised that electrical signals recorded from the scalp have 
a neural origin and therefore can be useful to determine biologically meaningful 
processes. Initially developed as a tool to study epilepsy, the potential for EEG was 
realised by sleep scientists as a powerful tool for probing into the proverbial “black 
box”. In 1953, Kleitman and Asterinski described for the first time a series of stable 
time periods during sleep characterised by pendular or rolling movement of the eyes 
 9 
accompanied by high frequency brain activity measured with EEG. This came to be 
known in the literature as rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, and thus the science of 
polysomnography was born. Dement and Kleitman (1957) then became the first to 
argue empirically for a link between EEG activity and subjective experience, 
reporting a high incidence of dream reports occurred during REM sleep. 
Four other sleep stages of sleep have been proposed (figure 2), defined as 
Non-REM (NREM) stages 1, 2, 3, and 4 (further abbreviated to N1, N2, N3 and 
N4). Later, N3 and N4 were grouped into a single N3 stage (Silber et al., 2007) and 
this system has since been adopted by clinicians and sleep researchers alike to treat 
and understand sleep-related questions. Despite radical advances in the analysis of 
the EEG signal, the sleep scoring method has remained relatively unchanged ever 








Typically, sleep scoring using PSG involves the breakup of the sleep EEG 
recording into 30 second time-windows, coupled with recording of muscle 
(electromyography; EMG), eye (electro-oculography, EOG), and heart 
(electrocardiography; ECG) electrical activity, as well as measures of respiration. 
Each 30-second epoch is then evaluated by eye and scored by one or two 
independent raters. This is an arduous process, nonetheless still preferred by many 
researchers despite some automated alternatives available. Furthermore, the use of 
Image redacted for copyright reasons. Copyright holder unknown. 
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fixed 30-second epochs and the incorporation of only a handful of EEG electrodes 
is likely to provide an incomplete representation of brain activation during sleep. 
This particular problem was recognised by Iber (2007) in the official 
guidelines for sleep scoring issued by the American Association for Sleep Medicine 
(AASM). Specifically, the sleep onset period (SOP) presents a challenge to the 
current scoring method due to its high heterogeneity and fast-changing dynamics 
(Hori, et al., 1994). When considering whether or not to include a category of 
drowsiness into the AASM guidelines, the scientific committee voted against doing 
so and instead opted to retain the original nomenclature, classifying wakefulness and 
N1 sleep as discrete stages.  
Nonetheless, it is recognised that the transition from wakefulness to sleep is 
not a discrete process (with some exceptions, e.g. severe cases of narcolepsy), but a 
dynamic and gradual transition. This led Hori and colleagues (1994) to suggest that 
the sleep onset period not be evaluated under 30-second time windows, but using 
shorter 4-5 second windows in order to better represent the heterogeneity of the 
transition process. They put forward a classification system comprised of 9 stages in 
an attempt to encompass the full transition from wakefulness through to the 
beginning of N2 sleep (figure 3).  Crucially, by dividing the EEG signal into shorter 
time windows the Hori-scoring method provides a slightly temporal resolution that 





FIGURE 3. EEG ACTIVITY ASSOCIATED TO DIFFERENT ALERTNESS MICROSTAGES. 
COLOURED REGIONS INDICATE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF EACH MICROSTAGE . 
ADAPTED FROM JAGANNATHAN, ET AL. (2018).  
 
As Ogilvie (2001) has argued, understanding the SOP means understanding 
that there is no single “moment” of sleep onset. Rather, different neurobehavioural 
changes can be observed at different moments within the SOP (figure 4). To 
illustrate, one example of such changes comes from findings on auditory oddball 
paradigms (Winter, et al., 1995; Nittono, et al., 1999). Oddball paradigms consist of 
presenting a series of frequent identical tones with semi-randomly interspersed 
deviant tones (i.e. qualitatively different from the frequent tone). A signature of 
oddball paradigms is the resulting mismatch negativity (MMN) that comes from 
subtracting the frequent stimulus ERP from the oddball stimulus ERP, which is then 
used to infer whether or not the relevant sensory information was processed. Winter 
et al. (1995) found that MMN was still present during awake and N2 trials, but 
Image redacted for copyright reasons. Copyright holder is Neuroimage. 
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changed during drowsy N1 trials, instead reflected by a broader fronto-central 
negative deflection. They speculate this to be reflective of a switch between 
environmental scanning mechanisms that occurs during drowsiness. This hypothesis 
remains an intriguing open question. 
In a more recent study, Kouider et al. (2014) designed a semantic 
categorisation task where participants were asked to classify words into animal vs 
object categories. Surprisingly, LRPs typically associated with motor response 
planning were still observed during N1 and early N2 even when participants had 
become unresponsive. This demonstrated that semantical decision making and 
motor selection are preserved throughout N1 even after the loss of motor response.  
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FIGURE 4. A BIOBEHAVIOURAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DYNAMIC CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH 
DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE SLEEP ONSET PERIOD. ADAPTED FROM OGILVIE (2001).  
Image redacted for copyright reasons. Copyright holder is Sleep Medicine Reviews. 
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The SOP is not only associated with distinct changes in cognitive processing, but 
also accompanied by distinct phenomenological experiences (Goupil & 
Bekinschtein, 2012), including the emergence of spontaneous, vivid imagery akin to 
dreaming. So-called microdreams (Nielsen, 2017) could provide a theoretical 
stepping stone in understanding how subjective phenomal experience shifts from 
external to internally generated, thus answering not only the question of how 
consciousness fragments but also how consciousness is reconstructed during sleep. 
 
1.6 Sleep deprivation as it relates to conscious state 
and content 
 
We began this introduction by asking ‘what is consciousness for?’ We attempted 
to illustrate the difficulties that come with defining the question itself and the 
challenges of devising falsifiable hypotheses suitable for empirical study. In a parallel 
manner, biologists and cognitive scientists have attempted to answer the other side 
of the question (what is sleep for?) to moderately more success. 
Tononi and Cirelli (2003; 2006) argue that sleep is (1) ubiquitous across animal 
species, (2) homeostatically regulated, and that (3) sleep deprivation comes at the 
cost of harmful consequences to the point of death (e.g. in sleep-deprived rats after 
2-4 weeks). Dolphins are an interesting example, given that rather than evolving 
sleepless brains, they evolved a mechanism that enables unihemispheric sleep, during 
which they display a behaviour known as circular swimming.  Altogether, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that sleep has an essential function across the animal kingdom. 
Sleep is widely considered to be essential for processes involved in learning 
and memory consolidation. The synaptic homeostasis hypothesis (Tononi and 
Cirelli, 2003) suggests that neuronal synapses become potentiated during 
wakefulness as a result of new memory traces. The intensity of synaptic potentiation 
is directly related to the proportion of slow wave sleep (SWS) displayed during the 
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subsequent period of sleep. During SWS, synaptic weights are downscaled in order 
for new traces to become consolidated into long term memory. 
Under the synaptic homeostasis theory, sleep deprivation is hypothesised to 
disrupt the homeostatic balance between synaptic strengthening and downscaling, 
resulting in the saturation of synaptic network connectivity, resulting in cognitive 
impairment (Niethard and Born, 2019). Furthermore, sleep deprivation has been 
found to reduce metabolic activity in prefrontal, parietal, and thalamic brain regions 
(Basner et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, the study by Gevers, et al. (2015) described previously showed 
that it was specifically functions associated with frontal executive regulation of 
attention which become most affected by sleep deprivation. Slama, et al. (2018) 
conducted a simple study where they administered an N-back, Stop Signal and a 
cued match-to-sample task. Participants performed all three tasks, once after a night 
of full sleep, and a second time after a full night of sleep deprivation. They found 
impairments of sleep deprivation on task-goal switching and response inhibition, but 
preserved working memory (WM). This paints a mixed picture on effects of sleep 
deprivation on cognition and opens an avenue for future research to pinpoint 




Thus far, we have outlined some of the difficulties encountered in the 
empirical study of consciousness. We have also delineated some of the frameworks 
developed over the past decades which have attempted to bridge the explanatory 
gap between phenomenal consciousness and its biological substrate, as well as 
established two key constructs in consciousness science: content and state. We have 
described how these constructs have informed the development of a science of 
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consciousness to the present moment, providing the framework for falsifiable 
scientific theories to be tested.  
We then presented a brief historical background on the science of sleep 
physiology and addressed some of the pitfalls in sleep-scoring systems. Specifically, 
we argued that the classification of drowsiness and sleep into a single category is not 
representative of the unique neural-behavioural changes that occur during this 
period. We suggest that a sub-staging method proposed by Hori, et al. (1994) is a 
better tool to characterise the transition from wakefulness to sleep, and might 
provide new insights into the cognitive-conscious fragmentation processes 
underlying the transition. 
Finally, we concluded by describing hypotheses of sleep function and its likely 
link to learning and memory consolidation. We further detailed how studies on sleep 
deprivation might shed light on the functional role of sleep, whilst revealing 
informative patterns about cognition. 
 
1.8 Outline of Chapters 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to shed light on the cognitive effects that 
follow the transition from wakefulness to sleep. The question we seek to answer is 
two-fold:  
1) How does the gradual loss of alertness modulate cognitive control 
functions? 
2) What forms of cognitive control might sleep be necessary for? 
 Our approach has been driven by the hypothesis that consciousness is 
selectively required for some cognitive processes and not others. Therefore, 
fluctuations in alertness (a linear dimension of consciousness) were expected to 
produce a larger effect in those processes that are more reliant on consciousness.  
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In chapter 2 we begin by testing the ecological validity of a still relatively 
unexplored scale (Hori) as a way to classify of the SOP into functionally meaningful 
sub-stages. Based on our Hori classification we derived 3 different categories of 
alertness as participants performed either a Go/NoGo task or a simpler Go-
left/Go-right task. We hypothesised that responsiveness and reaction times would 
be more affected in those trials where conflict monitoring is required (i.e. the 
Go/NoGo task), providing evidence that cognitive control is more susceptible to 
the effects of reduced alertness than simpler semantic decisions. 
To overcome the limitations of manual Hori scoring, we developed an 
automated algorithm to classify trials into 3 alertness categories using Hori stage 
principles. This microstaging method was published in the journal Neuroimage 
(Jahannathan, Ezquerro-Nassar, et al., 2018) and is included as a manuscript. 
The method in Chapter 3 was then employed in Chapters 4 and 5, where we 
investigated effects of alertness and sleep deprivation in an auditory conflict task. 
We hypothesised that immediate conflict would still be detected and resolved under 
drowsiness (i.e. unaffected by reductions in alertness). On the other hand, we 
hypothesised that trial-by-trial conflict adaptation would be impaired during 
drowsiness. Chapter 3 is concerned with the behavioural findings of the study, while 
Chapter 4 addresses the modulatory effects of alertness and sleep deprivation on 





The effect of Drowsiness on Conflict 
Monitoring 
 
n this chapter, I present the results from a study investigating the effect of 
alertness on two different decision-making tasks. Two sets of participants 
(each n=30) performed one of either task 1 or task 2. Task 1 involved a simple 
go-left/go-right decision following the presentation of a tone sequence.  Task 2 
involved a similar presentation of tones but added a Go/NoGo criteria, thus 
imposing an additional constraint on the decision (i.e. a response inhibition 
criterion). Crucially, “go” trials in task 1 and 2 were perceptually equivalent, but 
differed in cognitive load. We reasoned that adding an extra criterion of response 
inhibition would increase the need for top-down cognitive control, thus making the 
decision more susceptible to fluctuations in alertness. Confirming this hypothesis, 
we found that an effect of drowsiness depended upon task instruction, as indicated 
by an interaction between alertness and task on responsiveness and reaction times. 
We conclude that decisions requiring cognitive control are more susceptible to 





Cognitive control is a key executive process, underlying cognitive flexibility 
and behavioural adaptability to environmental change. Yet, while many evolutionary 
theories of consciousness argue that behavioural adaptability is also the main 
advantage consciousness (i.e. subjective experience), it has been shown that at least 
some components of cognitive control continue to operate outside awareness (Van 
Gaal, et al., 2012; Linzarini, et al., 2017).  
Cognitive control is not a single function, but rather a group of goal-oriented 
processes ever-changing in line with task demands. Such processes include conflict 
monitoring and motor inhibition. Nigg (2000) suggested there are at least four types 
of inhibition, one of such being response inhibition, exemplified by the Go/NoGo 
task.  
The Go/NoGo task involves the presentation of stimuli that indicating the 
participant whether or not to effect a predetermined motor response (i.e. ‘Go’ and 
‘NoGo’ stimuli). In order to perform the task efficiently, there must not only be an 
activation of the motor plan, but simultaneously an activation for the alternative plan 
to inhibit the motor response. This entails that in order to perform a Go/NoGo 
task, it is necessary to keep mechanisms of conflict monitoring active across all trials 
and the motor plan selection either. This requires constant performance monitoring 
throughout all trials. Van Boxtel et al (2001) conceptualise this form of inhibition to 
be a non-selective, less complex than that required for interference suppression (e.g. 
a Simon task), which requires the selection of a response 
Typically, Go trials are used as controls against which neural activity in the 
NoGo trials is compared.  Using this strategy, a consistent negativity in the frontal 
EEG signal has been found for NoGo trials after 200-300ms (N2) followed by a 
positive ERP 250-500ms (P300) after the NoGo stimulus is presented (Enriquez-
Geppert, et al., 2010). In this context, both the N200 and the P300 have typically 
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been interpreted as reflective of inhibitory activity. However this view has been put 
in question, by arguing instead that these components are instead the result of 
conflict monitoring (Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 2010; Chatham, et al., 2012; Donkers 
& Van Boxtel, 2004). 
Donkers & Van Boxtel (2004) designed a set of sister tasks, conceived to 
differentiate the effects of inhibition against the effects of conflict monitoring. The 
first task consisted of a standard Go/NoGo while the second task (the “go/GO” 
task) required participants to effect either nominal or forceful responses to a 
stimulus. In both tasks, response cue was preceded by an arrow indicating whether 
to execute a left or a right response. Crucially, ‘go’ trial frequency for both tasks was 
set at either 50 or 80% in order to manipulate response bias. When ‘go’ trials were 
frequent (i.e. 80%), they found the N200 component was modulated ‘NoGo’ trials 
in the Go/NoGo task, but also by ‘GO’ trials in the go/GO task, indicating that 
N200 might not be a measure of inhibition but rather a measure of conflict 
monitoring. This suggests that ‘go’ trials in a Go/NoGo task are not exempt from 
the need of cognitive control, but rather inform behaviour and are themselves 
subject to conflict monitoring processes.  
2.2 Research Question 
 
This study seeks to address a general question: does alertness modulate 
conflict monitoring during a Go/NoGo task? 
More specifically, we address the following: 
1. Is responsiveness during a go/nogo task modulated as a 
function of alertness? We hypothesised that a task demanding top-down 
conflict monitoring and inhibitory preparation would result in reduced 
responsiveness during drowsiness, compared to the task where no such 
monitoring is required. 
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2. Is reaction time during a go/nogo task modulated by alertness? 
We expected that trials where conflict monitoring is required would result in 
higher RTs. Crucially, we also predicted an interaction would emerge between 





60 healthy participants (age range: 18-35) performed one of either a go-
left/go-right task (n=30) or a go/nogo task. During the go-left/go-right task —
referred from here onwards as the go task— participants listened to a series of tone 
pairs, where the first tone indicated whether to press a left or a right button. An 
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1550ms was followed by a second tone, prompting 
participants to execute a response. Inter-trial interval varied from 5-12s. Participants 
were instructed to respond as accurately as possible and each session consisted of a 
variable trial number between 100-250.  
Stimuli, ISI, and tone-response mapping in the GO trials for the Go/NoGo 
task were equal to those in the Go task. ITI also varied randomly between 5-12s. 
However, a second type of trial was introduced, requiring participants to inhibit their 
response in case of a mismatch between the sound of the first and the second 
stimulus (see Fig 5). During both tasks, participants were allowed to fall asleep but 
were awakened and prompted to continue if stage 2 was detected by eye (online) or 
if two trials were missed in a row. They were instructed to keep bodily movements 
to a minimum and keep the eyes closed throughout the experiment.  
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FIGURE 5. SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF OUR GO AND GO/NOGO PARADIGMS. THE GO 
TASK REQUIRED PARTICIPANTS TO PRESS A LEFT OR RIGHT KEY CONTINGENT UPON 
STIMULUS 1. THE GO/NOGO TASK CONSISTED OF THE SAME SET OF STIMULI, BUT STIMULUS 
2 ALTERNATED BETWEEN A ‘GO’ AND A ‘STOP’ SIGNAL, REQUIRING PARTICIPANTS TO 
EXECUTE OR INHIBIT A RESPONSE. 60 PARTICIPANTS WERE RANDOMLY SPLIT INTO EACH 
TASK (N=30).  
 
2.3.2 EEG 
Participants were fitted with an EGI electrolyte 62-channel cap (Neuroscan systems) 
after receiving the task instructions and subsequently signing an informed written 
consent form. EEG was sampled at 500Hz, then downsampled to 250Hz and high-
pass filtered at 1Hz. Continuous EEG data was epoched at -5500 to 4000ms around 
second stimulus onset. Noisy channels where variance exceeded 500 were rejected 
and interpolated using spherical interpolation. Noisy epochs were removed by visual 
inspection, where frequency and/or amplitude in multiple channels exceeded that 
normally observed in brain activity (see appendix A). Finally contamination from eye 
movements and muscle artefacts was reduced using independent component 
analysis (Delorme and Makeig, 2004).   
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2.3.3 Alertness classification of EEG data 
A method first suggested by Tanaka, Hayashi and Hori (1996), and modified 
by Goupil, Bekinschtein was used as a basis to classify the hypnagogic transition into 
10 stages. The first two stages represent wakefulness, and are characterised by the 
amount of alpha activity (8-10 Hz) present in the EEG signal. Stages 3-4 represent 
early drowsiness (N1), and stages 5 onwards contain the features of deep N1 all the 
way into N2. Pretrial epochs from -4000 to 0ms were manually classified according 
to alertness level and then grouped into awake (Hori 1-2), mild drowsy (Hori 3-4) 
and severe drowsy (Hori 5-10). For a detailed description of the manual Hori scale 
classification method in full detail, see Chapter 3. 
2.3.4  Statistical analysis 
 
Responsiveness was analysed through a generalised linear mixed model 
(GLMM) using the presence-absence method described by Zuur et al (2010). 
Variance was modelled using a binary distribution and participant ID was used as a 
random intercept, and response was coded as a 0-1 variable, with 1 for response and 
0 for no response. 
For RT analysis, trials with RTs lower than 200 or higher than 3000ms were 
removed. Only Go trials were included in analysis and all types of errors were 
excluded. RTs were log transformed and analysed using a linear mixed effect model 
(LMM). Among other advantages, both LMM ang GLMM are robust to missing 
data and thus were optimal for our dataset, which is unbalanced in most of our 
predictor variables. Accuracy in the Go task (mean= 99.18%, SD= 1.27) and the 
Go/NoGo task (mean=98.21%, SD=2.72) were not further analysed, as 
performance was likely at ceiling. 
As proposed by (Zuur, et al., 2010), we used a top-down approach to derive 
our best model for as follows: 
 25 
1. Defined a model where the fixed parameters contain all 
explanatory variables of interest and their interactions. This is referred to as 
the beyond optimal model. 
2. Used the beyond optimal model to optimise the structure for 
random effects in order the random components from containing 
information relevant to the fixed component of the final model. We used log-
likelihood to choose our final random component structure. 
3. Having found our optimal random structure, we then moved to 
determine the fixed component of the model. Here Zuur, et al. (2010) suggest 
reducing the fixed parameters by using the t-statistic. I.e. parameters with 
estimates with p>0.05 are removed in a stepwise manner and contrasted 
against the full model using the likelihood ratio test (LRT). 
4. Once a final model was selected, we used restricted maximum 
likelihood (REML) estimates to redraw the final model structure. 
5. We validated the RT model by plotting the distribution of its 
residuals on a histogram and visually assessed proximity to a normal 
distribution. The GLMM for responsiveness was validated by plotting the 
continuous predictor against the residuals. 
2.4 Results 
 
In order to understand the spread of our data across Hori stages, we first 
charted our total count of GO trials across participants in different Hori stages, 
regardless of responsiveness.  
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FIGURE 6. TOTAL NUMBER OF ‘GO’ TRIALS IN EACH OF OUR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
DIVIDED ACROSS HORI STAGES. 
 
As can be easily noticed in figure 6, trials in earlier Hori stages were much 
more prevalent than trials in late Hori stages. As such, we decided to group trials 
into 3 different alertness categories (figure 7): 
(1) Awake: Hori stages 1-2 
(2) Mild drowsy: Hori stages 3-4 
(3) Severe drowsy: Hori stage 5-10 
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FIGURE 7. TOTAL NUMBER OF ‘GO’ TRIALS IN EACH OF OUR EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
DIVIDED BY ALERTNESS.  ALERTNESS 1 REPRESENTS WAKEFULNESS (HORI 1-2), ALERTNESS 
TWO REPRESENTS MILD DROWSINESS (3-4), AND ALERTNESS 3 REPRESENTS SEVERE 
DROWSINESS (HORI 5-10) 
 




After grouping trials in alertness groups 1-3, we analysed whether 
responsiveness during the task was associated to trial-by-trial levels of alertness we 
derived from our Hori scores. A look at individual participant data begins to show 
a trend, with seemingly more participants becoming unresponsive in alertness 3 for 




FIGURE 8. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIVENESS ACROSS ALERTNESS LEVELS DURING THE GO TASK. 
NUMBERS IN EACH CELL REPRESENT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TRIALS PER SUBJECT IN EACH 
CONDITION. EMPTY CELLS REPRESENT CONTITIONS WITH 0 TRIALS. 
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FIGURE 9. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIVENESS ACROSS ALERTNESS LEVELS DURING THE 
GO/NOGO TASK. NUMBERS IN EMPTY CELLS REPRESENT CONDITIONS WITH 0 TRIALS. 
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A further look at group means in each task further revealed an interaction 
trend between alertness and type of task (figure 10).  
 
FIGURE 10. PROPORTION OF RESPONSIVE TRIALS IN EACH TASK ACROSS DIFFERENT LEVELS 
OF ALERTNESS. ALERTNESS 1 REPRESENTS THE MOST ALERT STAGES (HORI 1-2) AND 
ALERTNESS 3 REPRESENTS THE LEAST ALERT (HORI 5-10). SUBJECT-WISE AVERAGES WERE 
CALCULATED WITH BARS SHOWING SEM. 
 
We proceeded to construct a GLMM with participant ID as random intercept. 
A presence-absence method for binomial distributions was implemented, following 
the top-down method suggested by Zuur, et al (2010). Our starting model was a 
task*alertness interaction with subject ID as random intercept. We found that this 
model was the most adequate in explaining responsiveness (table 1), supporting our 
hypothesis that a more complex task results in earlier loss of responsiveness. A post-
hoc analysis revealed that a model including only task as fixed effect (BIC= 6205.5) 
was no better than our null model (BIC= 6214.0, p=0.523), suggesting no 




TABLE 1. RESPONSIVENESS MODEL COMPARISON FOR THE GO/NOGO TASK 
Model Fixed Parameters Random Parameters Log-Likelihood Pr(>X2) 
Null Mean Intercept: ID -3093.8 - 
Task only Task Intercept: ID -3093.8 0.5227 
Alertness only Alertness Intercept: ID -2568.3 <0.001 
Independent effects Alertness + Task Intercept: ID -2568.3 <0.001 
Interaction Alertness*Task Intercept: ID -2557.5 <0.001 
 
2.4.2 Reaction Times 
 
In order to explore the distribution of RTs across alertness, we first plotted 
the distributions of trials from all participants divided by task and alertness. Whilst 
no differences are noticeable in the awake condition, RT distribution begins to 
flatten and spread increases with alertness in the Go/NoGo condition. RT 




FIGURE 11. DISTRIBUTION OF ALL RTS COLLAPSED ACROSS SUBJECTS SHOWING A LARGER 





FIGURE 12. RT GRAND MEANS AT DIFFERENT ALERTNESS LEVELS (SEM BARS). A NOTABLE 
DIFFERENCE EMERGES BETWEEN TASKS AT LATER STAGES OF DROWSINESS . THIS SERVES TO 
ILLUSTRATE THE FINDINGS FROM OUR MIXED MODEL, INDICATIVE OF AN INTERACTION 
BETWEEN TASK AND ALERTNESS LEVEL . 
 
To select our RT model, we began from the most complex model, also known 
as the beyond optimal model (Zuur, et al. 2010). Due to lack of convergence we 
could not model random slope and therefore kept only participant id as random 
intercept in our random effects component of the model. We proceeded to remove 
each fixed effect in a stepwise fashion. However, there was only need for a single 
step, as the task by alertness interaction effect was reliable (F(2,5057)= 17.38, p<0.001). 
The model also revealed an effect of alertness (F(2,5057)= 25.36, p<0.001) but no 
reliable effect of task (F(1,60.8)= 1.47, p=0.231). 
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A post-hoc comparison of estimated marginal means was conducted for 
single contrast between tasks in the 3 different alertness levels. This revealed a 
significant difference between the Go and Go/NoGo tasks only in the latest stage 
of drowsiness (alertness 3; mean=-0.25, SE=0.09, p=0.025) but no differences 
between Go and Go/NoGo tasks within alertness level 2 (mean=-0.01, SE=0.085, 
p=0.518), nor alertness level 1 (mean=-0.04, SE=0.083, p=0.475). In other words, 
differences between RTs in the Go task and the Go/NoGo task emerge during 




In this chapter, we investigated alertness as a modulator of conflict 
monitoring processes. We designed a pair of tasks that contained equivalent trials 
but varied in instruction: a Go task and a Go/NoGo task. Crucially, the Go/NoGo 
task required participants to monitor incoming information and prepare for 
inhibitory action. On the other hand, the Go task required participants to hold and 
execute a motor plan, with no inhibitory load. 
It has previously been suggested that some forms of cognitive control might 
be one of the few processes that con only be performed in the presence of 
consciousness (Kunde, et al., 2012), and indeed that the ability to flexibly respond 
to environmental changes might be the reason why consciousness evolved in the 
first place (Baars, 2002). However, some components of cognitive control have been 
shown to persist in the absence of conscious awareness. This includes inhibitory 
control, which has been found to operate in the absence of consciousness, or more 
specifically the absence of conscious awareness (Van Gaal & Lamme, 2012).  
We showed that while inhibitory control can still be executed under reduced 
levels of alertness, it comes at a price of longer cognitive processing. This suggests 
to us that even while inhibitory control might still be implemented in reduced states 
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of consciousness, it represents a heavier cognitive burden than simpler cognitive 
processes. As alertness continues to decrease, it appears that behaviour gets shut 
from the top-down. That is, cognitive control processes “shut down” before motor 
execution processes do.  
A shortcoming of this experiment is the variable trial number across 
participants and conditions. Whilst statistical confounds such as missing and 
unbalanced data are controlled for by mixed modelling, it is possible that other 
confounds may have been introduced. For instance, it’s likely that participants with 
more trials would experience higher demands on sustained attention, whilst more 
trials would also increase the likelihood of drowsiness. Therefore, the drop in 
performance observed during drowsiness could be the result of cognitive fatigue or 
boredom, rather than drowsiness per se. Further studies with balanced trial numbers 
could compare within-state changes in performance from early to late trials as a way 







Developing an Automated Method for 
Microstage Classification 
 
s is clear from Chapter 2, trial-by-trial classification of alertness is a useful 
tool if one wishes to understand cognitive changes associated with the 
transition from wakefulness to sleep. Additionally, the differential effect 
of alertness as a function of task demand is an important consideration for those 
who wish to study processes unrelated to alertness in order to avoid potential 
confounds. Particularly, fluctuations in alertness have been found to be a 
confounding factor in a large number of resting-state studies, even those with blocks 
as short as 3 minutes (Tagliazucchi & Laufs, 2014). However, significant hurdles 
make trial-by-trial classification challenging for most experimental settings. Firstly, 
Hori staging by eye is time-consuming and therefore not feasible for most 
researchers to implement into their analysis pipeline. Second, rating trials by Hori 
requires training and is bound to the effects of human variability. 
With this in mind, we set out to develop an automated trial-by-trial 
microstaging algorithm that reliably classifies trials into 3 alertness stages using 
variance and coherence masures, as well as incorporating the presence of sleep 
graphoelements (Jagannathan et al., 2018). This method presents several advantages 
for scientists interested in the study of transitional states, as well as cognitive 




3.1 Declaration of Contribution  
The following paper was published in the journal NeuroImage (2018). I 
contributed to the creation of the gold standard dataset by providing manual ratings 
for Hori stages across all trials in Dataset #1. I subsequently contributed to 
theoretical discussions during writing and provided continuous feedback on the 
manuscript until the point of publication.   
3.2 Note on Examiner Comments 
During the examination for this thesis, several minor inconsistencies which 
escaped peer-review were pointed out. Firstly, it was noted that the text description 
from figure 2 is inconsistent with the axis labels on figure 2B. The figure label 
should read “Biphasic consists of a sharp positive deflection followed by a negative 
one, whereas Monophasic consists of only a sharp negative deflection.” Similarly, 
the graphoelement detector figure of the supplementary materials is incorrect. 
Figure 10A incorrectly states filtering was done between 2-6Hz, when it was 
correctly reported in the paper to be between 0.25-6 Hz. 
A second error regarding predictor variance (p145 of the paper) was pointed 
out, where it seemed like frequency bands A and D used for predictor variance are 
overlapping. This is not the case. Rather, frequency band D was in fact 12-16 Hz, 
and not 2-6 Hz as is written on the paper. Finally, the electrodes on p142 appear to 
be lateralised in the case of the automated Hori scoring. However, this is due to a 
misleading graphical representation of the electrodes’ location. They were in fact 
symmetrically distributed. 
    Regarding the use of different electrodes for the manual and automated 
scoring, there were multiple reasons for this approach. The manual hori scoring 
relied on the most common electrode arrangement used in sleep staging methods. 
However, being less constrained by convention with the automated method we 
sought to survey a wider area of scalp EEG. We also reduced the number of 
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electrodes in order to ease the computational burden of running the algorithm. 
Finally, it is important to clarify that trials were assessed as a whole, rather than with 
each electrode individually. This means that the presence of a signature 
graphoelement in just one electrode was sufficient to classify the whole trial into the 
corresponding microstage. In practice, however, it would be rare to observe a 
graphoelement appear just in one electrode, as they are normally spread across a 
number of proximal electrodes. Classification of each microstage was done in the 








































Conflict Under Pressure: Investigating 
Reduced Alertness and Sleep Deprivation 
as Behavioural Modulators of Cognitive 
Control 
 
n this chapter, I present behavioural results of 42 participants who performed an Auditory 
Simon task while transitioning between wakefulness and sleep, overlapping with data 
published in Canales-Johnson, et al. (2020).  Subjects attended two morning sessions, one 
of which was preceded by a night of partial sleep deprivation (<4hrs of sleep). Firstly, we 
qualitatively assessed variability between subjects and individual differences in reaction times (RTs) 
and error rates. We then undertook a mixed modelling approach on RTs in order to better 
understand the relationship between alertness, sleep deprivation, current congruency and previous 
trial congruency on the conflict effect. EEG data was also collected and results are presented in 
Chapter 5. 
This collaborative study was run across multiple labs and with the contribution of multiple 
lab members. Considering the richness of the data, we opted to publish a manuscript focused on 
the neural mechanisms of cognitive control under reduced alertness (led by Canales-Johnson) 
separately from the manuscript addressing the question of sleep deprivation, even though both 
datasets were collected in parallel. When defining the structure of this thesis, we considered adding 
the resulting journal article at the end as an appendix, in order to avoid confusion between 
methodologies followed. Of note, the thesis contains a re-analysis of the behavioural data using a 
statistical approach better suited to missing and unbalanced data: linear mixed modelling. This 
circumvented some of the limitations in the behavioural analysis from Canales-Johnson, et al. 
(2020) and revealed an unreported interaction effect between alertness and conflict adaptation. 
I 
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Subsequently, the EEG pipeline was repeated as performed on the paper but incorporated 
the sleep deprived data into the analysis. For clarity, we adapted the methods from Canales-
Johnson, et al (2020) into the chapter. 
4.1 Declaration of contribution 
I collected all of the normal sleep and the sleep deprivation data for this study with the 
assistance of Henry Wang, a part II student under my co-supervision. I assisted with the pre-
processing of the EEG data and the microstaging technique. I contributed to discussions and 































4.2 Brief re-Introduction 
Cognitive control is the ability to flexibly allocate mental resources in 
response to the demands of a task. This process is reliant –among other things–  on 
the successful detection and resolution of conflict, followed by top-down 
modulation of behaviour (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Conflict detection is thought 
to be mediated locally by the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and to require acute 
local brain activation for short term information maintenance (Jiang et al., 2015). On 
the other hand, the capacity to retain information from preceding conflict and adjust 
behaviour to the presence of conflict (i.e. conflict adaptation) is thought to require 
globally distributed brain networks for long term information maintenance 
(Mansouri et al., 2009).  
Cognitive control has largely been investigated through so-called conflict 
tasks (e.g. Jiang et al., 2015; Kunde et al., 2003) where participants are asked to make 
decisions according to task-relevant cues while ignoring task-irrelevant dimensions. 
The task becomes more effortful when relevant and irrelevant domains are 
meaningfully related, given that task-irrelevant cues interfere with task-relevant cues 
when attempting to produce an appropriate response.  
Consider Simon-type paradigms, such as the Stroop task. The conflict 
monitoring model (CMM) states that the triggering of cognitive control requires 
online conflict monitoring to detect incongruences between stimulus dimensions 
(MacDonald et al., 2000). This process has been hypothesised to rely on fast-
decaying, local brain processes of conflict detection in the anterior cingulate cortex 
(Van Veen et al., 2001). On the other hand, conflict adaptation is thought to require 
durable and stable neural activation for information relay across multiple high-level 
cortical regions, with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) playing a regulatory 
role (Mansouri et al., 2009). 
In line with predictions from the CMM, a study by Jiang et al. (2015) found 
that both instantaneous conflict and inter-trial conflict adaptation were associated 
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with medial frontal theta power modulations, regardless of conflict awareness. 
However, only conflict that was fully consciously perceived was associated with 
inter-trial conflict adaptation processes reflected by an increase in theta power in the 
DLPFC.  
To this day, most studies investigating cognitive control as a function of 
consciousness have focused on the extent of conscious access to relevant and 
irrelevant stimulus dimensions in the awake state. On the other hand, fewer studies 
have investigated cognitive control as it relates to state of consciousness. This 
question is relevant if we wish to understand how conscious state modulates 
behavioural and neural markers of conflict and conflict adaptation. Thus,  we set out 
to investigate the behavioural and neural markers of conflict in the transition from 
drowsiness to sleep, to test whether conflict effects under reduced alertness would 
follow a similar pattern to those observed in reduced awareness (Jiang, et al. 2015). 
 
4.2.1 Sleep deprivation 
Alertness and sleep deprivation are two powerful yet dissociable factors that 
modulate the state of consciousness. For instance, it has been shown that a night of 
sleep deprivation can result in increased euphoria the following morning and is 
argued by some to be the most successful form of antidepressant therapy 
(Dallaspezia & Benedetti, 2015). However, over time, sleep deprivation tends to 
increase pressure on the organism as it incurs homeostatic “sleep debt” (Borbély et 
al., 2016).  
 A second question relates to the effect that general disruption of prefrontal 
regions via sleep deprivation would have on conflict monitoring and adaptation. 
Sleep deprivation has been found to reduce activity on the fronto-parietal attention 
network (Ma, et al., 2015), including the prefrontal cortex (Ramdani et al., 2013)  and 
ACC (Hsieh, 2007). Additionally, we have found that these networks become 
increasingly distributed when conflict is presented under reduced alertness (Canales-
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Johnson, et al, 2020). Therefore, we hypothesised that sleep deprivation would 
disrupt the mechanisms enabling conflict detection and conflict adaptation, with the 
latter being the most disrupted.  
Sleep deprivation can be thought of as a functional disturbance of the 
cognitive system akin to a reversible lesion, whereas changes in alertness microstates 
can be better understood as functional rearrangements of a healthy system. Studied 
in conjunction, sleep deprivation and drowsiness provide a framework to understand 
the interplay between state of consciousness and functional integrity of the brain. In 
line with previous reports from the WM literature, (e.g. Chee and Choo, 2004), we 
expect that sleep deprivation will impair the networks responsible for long term 
information maintenance required for conflict adaptation. However, under the 
assumption that conflict detection is a local process that occurs largely outside 
awareness, we expect conflict detection will not be impaired by sleep deprivation. 
4.3 Research Question 
 
This chapter seeks to address one general question: do sleep deprivation and 
drowsiness modulate the detection of conflict and adaptation to conflict? 
More specifically, we wish to address the following questions: 
1. Is the process of conflict detection modulated by alertness? 
2. Is the process of conflict detection modulated by sleep deprivation? 
3. Is the process of conflict adaptation modulated by alertness? 
4. Is the process of conflict adaptation modulated by sleep deprivation? 
5. Conflict detection is considered to be a local, mostly unconscious process, 
whilst conflict adaptation is thought to require consciousness and long-
range connectivity. Do drowsiness and sleep deprivation selectively affect 
adaptation to conflict, whilst still allowing conflict detection processes? 
We expected drowsy, sleep deprived and incongruent trials to be related to 
higher (i.e. slower) RTs. We expected to find an interaction between previous and 
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current trial congruency in the awake but not in the drowsy trials in both normal 





42 participants (20 females, age range: 18-30, mean age= 24.03) were 
recruited using the University of Cambridge online recruitment system (SONA). 
All participants were healthy with no auditory impairment, no history of psychiatric 
illness or head injury. Participants received monetary compensation upon 
completion of the second session. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee of the University of Cambridge and all participants provided written 
informed consent after an explanation of the experimental protocol.  
 
4.4.2 Behavioural paradigm 
 
Participants performed an auditory version of a Simon task based on Pieters 
(1981) where recorded samples of a native English speaker saying ‘left’ or ‘right’ 
were presented to participants on the left or right ears, resulting in four categories 
(i.e. left congruent, left incongruent, right congruent, and right incongruent). A 
stimuli was considered congruent when the word meaning corresponded to its 
physical location (e.g. ‘left’ in the left ear) and incongruent when the opposite 
occurred (e.g. ‘left’ in the right ear). All four types of trials were presented equally 
often in a random order. Participants were asked to press a button with their left or 
right thumb to report the location specified by the stimulus (the words ‘left’ or 
‘right’), and ignore the physical location of the stimulus (left or right ear). Participants 
were instructed to perform the task as accurately and as fast as possible. There were 
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no practice blocks and no feedback on performance provided at any point during 
the task.  
The time between a response and the following stimulus was randomly set 
between 2 and 2.5 seconds. The inter stimulus interval was set to 2 seconds in 
absence of a response within that timeframe. As a result, the inter stimulus interval 
could vary from 2 seconds (response absent) to 4.49 seconds (maximum response 
latency of 1.99 seconds + maximum response stimulus interval of 2.5). 
Prior to testing, participants were instructed to get a normal night’s rest on 
the night previous to testing. Testing began between 9am and 5pm and lasted 
approximately 3 hours. Upon arrival, participants were sat down in a comfortable 
adjustable chair in an electrically shielded room. Participants were fitted with an EGI 
electrolyte 128-channel cap (Electrical Geodesics, Inc. systems) after receiving the 
task instructions and subsequently signing an informed written consent. Task 
instructions were to respond as fast and accurately as possible, to keep bodily 
movements to a minimum and to keep the eyes closed throughout the experiment. 
Participants were asked to report their answers with their thumbs on two buttons of 
a four-button response box that rested on their lap or abdomen. 
During the “awake” block of the experiment, participants were instructed to 
stay awake, but with eyes closed. The back of the chair was set up straight and the 
lights in the room remained on. This block contained 500 trials and lasted for 
approximately 25 minutes.  
Following the awake block, participants then repeated the same task, but this 
time were allowed to fall asleep. The chair was reclined to a comfortable position 
and the lights were turned off. Participants were offered a pillow and blanket and 
were told that the experimenter would prompt them if they missed 5 consecutive 
trials. This part of the experiment consisted of 2000 trials and lasted for 
approximately 1.5 hours. At the end of the session, participants were sat upright, 
and the EEG cap was removed. Stimuli were presented using PsychToolbox 
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software on a MacBook computer and data were acquired using NetStation on a 
second MacBook computer.  
4.4.3 Sleep Deprivation 
In a counterbalanced manner, 25 participants from the normal sleep session 
attended the lab a second session where they were asked to sleep for no longer than 
4 hours on the previous night. 5 participants who attended the sleep deprived session 
did not attend the normal sleep session. In order to monitor participants sleep hours, 
messages were sent throughout the night via email requiring them to respond. 
However, no independent verification was done to ensure participant reporting of 
time spent sleeping was accurate. 
 
 
FIGURE 13. SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF OUR EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM. 
PARTICIPANTS WERE ASKED TO LISTEN TO THE WORDS “LEFT” AND “RIGHT” 
PRESENTED TO DIFFERENT EARS. THEY WERE INSTRUCTED TO LISTEN TO THE WORDS 
AND PRESS A BUTTON WITH EITHER THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT HAND, WHILE IGNORING 
THE LOCATION (EAR) WHERE THE WORD WAS PRESENTED FROM. THE TASK WAS SPLIT 
BETWEEN A SHORT (APPROX 20 MIN) "AWAKE" SESSION AND A LONGER (APPROX 90 MIN)  




Each experimental session lasted between 2-2.5 hours, during which 128-
channel high-density EEG data were collected using EGI gel caps (Electrical 
Geodesics Inc., Oregon, USA). Data were recorded in microvolts (V), sampled at 
500 Hz and referenced to the vertex, using the Net Amps 300 amplifier (Electrical 
Geodesics Inc., Oregon, USA).  
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EEG pre-processing was done by means of custom-made MATLAB 
(R20126, The MathWorks, Inc.) scripts supported by EEGLAB (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004). Data form 92 channels over the scalp surface were retained for 
further analysis (for more details on pre-processing, see Chapter 4). Trial-by-trial 
alertness was derived from these datasets as described in Chapter 3.  
4.4.5 Behavioural Analysis 
Trials were divided into awake or drowsy using the method described by 
Canales-Johnson, et al. (2020), included at the beginning of this chapter. The first 
trial of each block was discarded. Missed trials and incorrect trials were also removed 
from analysis, as well as trials with RT <200ms. For the conflict adaptation analyses, 
we included only trials where both previous trial and the current trial were correct. 
We opted to analyse RTs by adopting a multi-level modelling approach. 
Mixed models allow for missing data, which allowed us to include all subjects in the 
analysis (n=42), as opposed to including only those who attended both sessions 
(n=26). Given that performance is likely at ceiling (and thus, biased toward positive 
values), we did not pursue any statistical analyses. RTs were log transformed after 
observing that residuals from our initial models did not resemble a normal 
distribution. See Chapter 2 for a general overview of the model construction process. 
4.5 Results  
Participants performed an auditory Simon task in which they were asked to 
press a left or right button according to the meaning auditory stimuli (the words 
“left” and “right”) while ignoring the physical location of the stimulus. Conflict was 
introduced by altering the location of the stimulus, making it incongruent with the 
meaning. A first-hand inspection of the data reveals an expected slowing down and 
increased variability in RTs related to drowsiness, as shown graphically by 
stereotypical participants in figure 14.  
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We hypothesised both drowsiness and sleep deprivation would be associated 
with slower responses, irrespective of the need for cognitive control. However, given 
that conflict detection has been found to be preserved at reduced levels of awareness 
(Jiang et al., 2015), we predicted that, similarly, conflict detection processes would 
be preserved under reduced alertness. On the other hand, we predicted that reduced 
alertness would impair processes involved in conflict adaptation.  
We expected both conflict adaptation and conflict detection to be robust to 
sleep deprivation during wakefulness. However, in contrast to the normal sleep 
condition, we hypothesised that drowsiness in the sleep deprived condition would 
impair both conflict detection and  adaptation. 
4.5.1 Visual Assessment of Individual Variability  
As we expected, participants exhibit a clear increase in RT variability when 
they become drowsy, as can be seen by the individual plots in figure 14. Drowsiness 
also seems to be associated with overall slower RT across most participants, in both 





FIGURE 14. RT DATA OF FOUR PARTICIPANTS SHOWING INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY, AS 
WELL AS STEREOTYPICAL SLOWING DOWN AND “SPREADING OUT” OF RT 
DISTRIBUTIONS DURING DROWSINESS. EACH TRIAL IS REPRESENTED BY A COLOURED 
POINT, MEAN SHOWN BY BLACK DOTS WITH SD ON EITHER SIDES. 
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FIGURE 15. MEAN RTS IN PARTICIPANTS AFTER A NIGHT OF NORMAL SLEEP (NS) AND A 
NIGHT OF PARTIAL SLEEP DEPRIVATION (SD). EACH CONNECTED POINT REPRESENTS 
A PARTICIPANT, AND DASHED LINE INDICATES GRAND MEAN. 
 
Mean RT differences between congruent and incongruent trials of individual participants 
give a preliminary indication of a conflict effect, observed here as a trend towards slower responses 
for incongruent trials. Similarly, individual differences in error rates indicate more errors for 
incongruent than congruent trials. 
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FIGURE 16. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REACTION TIMES (RT) ACROSS SLEEP AND 





FIGURE 17. RTS FOR CONGRUENT AND INCONGRUENT TRIALS IN PARTICIPANTS WHO 




FIGURE 18. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ERROR RATE (ER) ACROSS SLEEP AND 
ALERTNESS CONDITIONS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. NS: NORMAL SLEEP; SD: SLEEP 
DEPRIVED 
 
FIGURE 19. MEAN ERROR RATES ACROSS PARTICIPANTS WHO ATTENDED THE NORMAL 
SLEEP (NS) AND THE SLEEP DEPRIVED (SD) SESSIONS (N=26) 
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On the other hand, while individual mean differences seem to show a clear 
effect of conflict across conditions, a conflict adaptation effect appears to be more 
clearly present during wakefulness, regardless of whether participants were sleep 
deprived or had slept normally. Such a trend is not apparent in the drowsy trials of 













FIGURE 20. ADAPTATION EFFECT BY PARTICIPANT SHOWING INDIVIDUAL RT 
DIFFERENCES. ADAPTATION DIFFERENCES WERE COMPUTED AS (CI-CC)-(II-IC). A 





FIGURE 21. CONFLICT ADAPTATION IN THE NORMAL SLEEP (NS) AND SLEEP DEPRIVED 
(SD) CONDITIONS. POINTS INDICATE GRAND MEAN. SEM BARS. 
 
4.5.2 Multilevel Modelling 
A mixed effects model approach was chosen to analyse our RT data. Mixed 
effects models offer a main advantage for our design, namely, they allow for 
participants with missing data to be included in the analysis. Additionally, mixed 
effect models allow for different number of observations, meaning that we were able 
to use trial-by-trial information in our analysis, as opposed to RT means by 
participant that an rmANOVA would require.  
As explained in the Methods section of this chapter, we began building our 
model by defining the random effects that best described our data. A random 
intercept by subject was assumed, however different random slopes were added and 
compared in a stepwise manner, as shown on Table 1. Ultimately, random intercept 
and random slope model was deemed to be the most optimal, using sleep, alertness 



















ID† 0 2 -15582 
  
+ Alertness‡ 1 2 -13487 4189.7 *** 
+ Sleep‡ 2 2 -14309 2545.5 *** 
+ Congruency‡ 3 2 - - Does not converge 
+ Previous congruency‡ 4 2 - - Does not converge 
 
Second step 




Alertness‡|ID† 1 2 -13487 
  
× Sleep‡ 7 7 -11682 3610.3 *** 
+ Sleep‡ 6 3 -12070 2832.7 *** 
†: Random intercepts 
‡: Random slopes 
χ2 = Pearson’s Chi-squared test; df = degrees of freedom 




Upon establishing our random structure, we moved to determine the optimal 
structure for our fixed effects. Following Zuur, et al (2010), we used LRT to remove 
effects in a stepwise fashion. Starting from a maximal effects model (as opposed to 
building from the most simple model upward) has been suggested to be the most 
optimal for psychological data, as it yields more generalisable findings and ensures 
no loss of explanatory power by wrongly including information as a random effect 
(Barr et al., 2013; Zuur et al., 2010).  
Table 2 shows our model selection process. Effects were removed in a 
stepwise fashion and each sub-model was compared to the full model in its 
respective step. Effects where no difference was observed upon removal were 
subsequently dropped in the following round. A final step is shown to indicate that 
removal of sleep from our fixed effects resulted in a significant difference, thus 











Fixed effect Model df Log-likelihood χ2 (df) p value 




- sleep:alert:prevcong:cong 1A 1 -11682 0.4386 0.5078 
 
Second step 




- sleep:alert:prevcong 2A 1 -11682 0.2653 0.6065 
- sleep:alert:cong 2B 1 -11682 1.2349 0.2665 
- sleep:prevcong:cong 2C 1 -11683 2.083 0.1489 
 
Third step 




- sleep:alert 3A 1 -11684 0.0001 0.9906 
- sleep:prevcong 3B 1 -11684 0.2129 0.6445 
- sleep:congruency 3C 1 -11684 0.0025 0.9604 
 
Fourth Step 




sleep 4A 1 -11686 4.9394 * 
χ2 = Pearson’s chi-squared test; Df = degrees of freedom 






Our final model was then established as follows: 
 Fixed component: sleep + alertness × previous congruency × congruency 
 Radom slope: sleep × alertness 
 Random intercept: ID  
 
An inspection of our chosen model (type III ANOVA with Satterthwaite’s 
Method) revealed main effects of sleep condition (F(1,29)= 5.15, p=0.031), alertness 
(F(1,41)= 84.05, p<0.001) and congruency (F(1,56556)= 464.46, p<0.001). An effect of 
adaptation was also found, indicated by a significant interaction between previous 
and current trial congruency (F(1,56560)= 157.60, p<0.001). A significant interaction 
between alertness, previous congruency and current congruency was also observed 
(F(1,56560)= 15.74, p<0.001).   
No significant effect was observed for previous congruency (F(1,56556)= 0.5027, 
p=0.478), nor was there a significant effect of the interaction between alertness and 
congruency (F(1,56556)= 1.9035, p=0.17). To investigate this further, a post-hoc 
analysis was performed by contrasting two linear models on log-transformed RTs. 
Stimulus congruency and alertness were included into the fixed component for both 
models. Crucially, the interaction term from one of the models, as follows: 
Interaction model 
 Fixed component: alertness + congruency + alertness:congruency 
 Radom slope: sleep × alertness 
 Random intercept: ID  
Independent effects model 
 Fixed component: alertness + congruency 
 Radom slope: sleep × alertness 
 Random intercept: ID  
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TABLE 4. MODEL COMPARISON 
 
We used the ‘anova’ function on the lmerTest package from R (version 3.1-
2) to compare different models’ performance. As predicted, the Interaction model 
for RTs was no better than our Independent Effects model (table 3). As further 
validation, when we compared our independent effects model to a null model which 
contained only the mean as a fixed parameter, i.e. the simplest fixed parameter (not 
shown on table), the ANOVA revealed the independent effects model to be better 




On this chapter, we sought to investigate the effect of drowsiness and sleep 
deprivation on cognitive control, operationalised via the conflict effect. Our main 
hypothesis was simple. If conflict detection is a fast, unconscious process, but 
conflict adaptation is long-term and consciousness-dependent, we should see a 
dissociation of the two processes indicated by performance during drowsiness. By 
contrast, we expected sleep deprivation to impair conflict detection mechanisms 
during drowsiness, in addition to conflict adaptation.  
Conflict detection was shown to be robust to all of our experimental 
manipulations, persisting throughout drowsiness even when participants were 
partially sleep deprived, counter to our hypothesis that sleep deprivation would 
impair conflict detection. This provides evidence that conflict detection is an 
automatic process robust to alertness and sleep manipulations. This is further 
illustrated by the low error rates exhibited across participants, indicating an all-or-
Model Fixed Parameters Random Parameters 
Log-
Likelihood Pr(>𝑿𝟐) 
Independent Alertness + Congruency 
Slope: sleep * alertness; 
Intercept: ID 
-11776  
Interaction Alertness * Congruency 




none process for conflict detection. I.e. as long as motor control can be executed, 
we can expect conflict detection to be reflected by behaviour.  
Given that task-relevant language processing has also been shown to occur in 
reduced alertness and into N2 sleep (Blume et al., 2017; Kouider et al., 2014), we 
could consider making the task non-dependent on language by introducing other 
forms of mapping, for instance by using a tones rather than words as we did in our 
go/nogo paradigm. In this case, we might observe an effect of alertness on conflict 
detection, assuming a weaker audiomotor mapping to a tone compared to a word. 
It is important to keep in mind that detection of conflict is a downstream process 
that relies upon feature discrimination. In this case, those features are the physical 
location and semantic content of a sound, so we can indirectly infer that both of 
these processes are also present at reduced levels of alertness. 
As evidenced by individual inspection of RTs, there is considerable between-
subject variability in our data. A strength in our design was the high number of trials 
collected per condition, which we then used to model RTs in a way that more 
accurately accounts for between-subject variation, offering an advantage over 
rmANOVA. Indeed, an initial analysis of our behavioural data (Canales-Johnson et 
al., 2020) using a two-way ANOVA had suggested that conflict adaptation was 
unaffected by drowsiness. Yet through a mixed model we revealed an interaction 
between alertness, previous trial congruency and current trial congruency, suggesting 
that alertness modulates adaptation to conflict. This is in contrast to findings 
reported by (Van Gaal, et al., 2010), who found that a conflict adaptation effect was 
present even when conflict primes were masked. This suggests that alertness and 
awareness are not be functionally equivalent. 
Importantly, we did not identify an interaction between alertness and 
congruency. Furthermore, a post-hoc analysis revealed no advantage of an 
interaction model over a simpler independent effects model, supporting our 
hypothesis that conflict detection is less reliant on consciousness, and thus can be 
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dissociated from the process of trial-by-trial conflict adaptation where reduced levels 
of alertness have a significant effect.  
Interestingly, while our sleep deprivation condition had a general slowing 
down effect on RTs, no significant interactions emerged between sleep deprivation 
and our other explanatory variables. This might indicate that sleep deprivation does 
not modulate neither conflict detection nor conflict adaptation. However, it has also 
been suggested that log transformations of RT might obscure interaction effects. 
Therefore, null findings around interactions must be interpreted with caution.  
A further limitation of our study was the lack of counterbalancing in the 
awake-drowsy order of sessions, which always consisted of the alert session first, 
followed by the drowsy session (figure 13). This was done in order to avoid a larger 
confounds of rest and napping. That is, if some sleep deprived participants had been 
allocated to the drowsy session first, there would have likely been an effect of 
nap/rest, conferring an advantage in performance over those who did not rest. Thus, 
alert sessions pre and post-drowsy would not have been equivalent. It is possible 
that not counterbalancing alert and drowsy sessions could have introduced practice 
effects into our analyses. However, previous studies have found practice effects 






Identifying the Neural Markers 
of Cognitive Control 
 
n Chapter 4, I presented the behavioural results from 42 participants who 
performed an auditory Simon task whilst transitioning from wakefulness to 
sleep. This chapter is concerned with the EEG results of the same set of 
subjects. First, we performed a cluster permutation analysis on time frequency data 
to investigate the effect of conflict in the theta frequency band in the frontal-central 
electrodes. Midfrontal theta has consistently been reported in the literature as a 
neural marker of conflict, and more broadly cognitive control. We observed an 
expected cluster in theta associated to conflict during wakefulness, however, we did 
not find any the same differences during drowsiness. Similarly, we found a theta 
cluster in awake, sleep deprived participants, but not during drowsiness. 
Following our univariate spectral analysis of EEG data, we used a multivariate 
decoding approach in order to investigate EEG patterns in our stimuli properties 
(i.e. location, semantic content, and congruency) without a priori selection of 





Cognitive control is an umbrella term, encompassing the range of mental 
processes that allow flexible, goal-directed behaviour. Such processes include 
impulse inhibition, error monitoring, task switching, and conflict detection, among 
others. Notwithstanding this diversity of functions, cognitive control has been 
consistently linked to prefrontal oscillatory activity in the EEG theta frequency band 
(Helfrich & Knight, 2016). Furthermore, frontal theta has been suggested by some 
to specifically reflect the detection of the need for control (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). 
The ubiquitous presence of theta across cognitive control tasks suggests it 
might be a robust neural marker, regardless of sensory dimension. Furthermore, 
Jiang and colleagues (2015) have found evidence that such a marker persisted even 
when conflict was unconsciously presented in a visual masking paradigm. Upon 
identifying that a behavioural conflict effect is still present during drowsiness both 
after a night of normal sleep and after sleep deprivation, we proceeded to investigate 
whether theta modulations associated with conflict would follow suit. 
5.2 Research Questions 
 
Considering that theta conflict effect generalises across tasks, even when 
conflict is not consciously perceived, this study investigates whether changes in theta 
power can still be detected in reduced states of alertness. Specifically, we were 
interested in the following questions: 
1. Can we detect a theta marker of conflict during an auditory Simon task? As 
has been widely reported in the literature, we expected to observe an increase 
in theta power to associated to incongruent trials, compared to congruent 
trials. Even though most studies of conflict have been conducted in the visual 
domain, we expect the same theta marker to be associated with conflict in the 
auditory domain. 
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2. Is conflict-related theta modulated by changes in alertness? We expected the 
difference in theta power between congruent and incongruent trials to be 
reduced during drowsiness, as reflected by an interaction between drowsiness 
and congruency. 
3. Does partial sleep deprivation modulate theta power during conflict 
detection? Similarly to drowsiness, we expected sleep deprivation to have a 
modulatory effect on theta during conflict. 
4. If so, at what level of processing is the conflict effect modulated by changes 
in alertness? In order to better understand the cognitive dynamics of the 
conflict effect, we used multivariate spectral decoding to classify stimulus 
congruency alongside location and semantic content of the stimuli.  We 
expected that if reduced alertness is selectively targeting cognitive control, we 
should expect stimulus properties continue to be represented during 
drowsiness even in cases when congruency is no longer classified above 
chance. 
5. Are conflict-related power differences related modulated by previous trial 
congruency? We expected the conflict adaptation effect observed in 
behaviour to be reflected by an interaction between previous trial congruency 
and current trial congruency. 
6. Is the effect of alertness on conflict adaptation mirrored by a similar effect on 
time-frequency power differences? We expected alertness to modulate 
differences in conflict-related theta reflecting the effects observed during 
conflict adaptation described in the previous chapter. Therefore, an 
interaction between alertness, previous trial congruency, and current trial 





5.3.1 Behavioural paradigm  
 




See section 4.4.1 for information on participants. Note that, except for when 
individual data is shown, all analyses were performed on the subset of participants 
who attended both the normal sleep and the sleep deprived sessions (n=25). 
 
5.3.3 EEG Analysis 
 
Approximately two hours of 128-channel high-density EEG data were 
collected for each participant with EGI electrolyte caps (Electrical Geodesics Inc., 
Oregon, USA), divided over separate datasets for the awake and drowsy part of the 
experiment. Data were recorded in microvolts (V), sampled at 500 Hz and 
referenced to the vertex, using the Net Amps 300 amplifier (Electrical Geodesics 
Inc., Oregon, USA).  
Pre-processing was done by means of custom-made MATLAB (R2016, The 
MathWorks, Inc.) scripts supported by EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Data 
form 92 channels over the scalp surface were retained for further analysis. Channels 
on the neck, cheeks and forehead, which are thought to contribute more movement-
related noise than signal (Chennu et al., 2014), were excluded. Continuous EEG data 
were first down-sampled to 250 Hz, filtered between 0.5 – 40 Hz and segmented 
into epochs from -1.5 to 2 s around stimulus onset. Thus, given that the minimal 
inter trial interval was 2 seconds, the pre-stimulus period of epoch n could overlap 
maximally 1.5 seconds with the post stimulus period of epoch n-1.  
Individual trials were then classified into awake and drowsy trials using the 
method described in Canales-Johnson, et al (2020; chapter 4). In contrast to the -4s 
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pre-trial segments originally used in Jagannathan, et al (2018), we used a -1.5s to 0s 
window to avoid trial overlap. RT variability and visual inspection of changes in 
power between awake- and drowsy-classified trials partially validated this approach. 
A typing error in Canales-Johnson, et al (2020) omitted theta from the frequency 
bands used in the coherence analysis of microstage classification, but it was in fact 
included. 
Subsequently, channels with a variance of 500 or higher were rejected. 
Independent Components Analysis (ICA) based on the Infomax ICA algorithm 
(Bell & Sejnowski, 1995) was done over all remaining channels. The topography and 
time course of the 20 components accounting for most variance in each dataset were 
inspected. Components typical of saccades and muscle artefacts were removed from 
the EEG signal (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Eye blink artifacts were identified by 
highly localised anterior distribution of weights, with sparse, large amplitude peaks 
across trials. Similarly, saccade components were highly localised to frontal channels, 
with a distinctive dipole pattern reflective of eye movements from side to side. 
Muscle artifacts were identified as localised, high frequency bursts with a power 
spectrum activity largely distributed towards higher frequencies. A conservative 
approach was adopted, with a range of 3-6 components rejected per dataset. 
After component rejection, the signals from the previously rejected channels 
were replaced with the average activity in all remaining channels by spherical spline 
interpolation. Trials were then rejected if they exceeded certain thresholds for 
amplitude (below -1500 microvolts or above 1500 microvolts) or slope (above 60 
microvolts). Finally, data were re-referenced to the average of all channels. 
The first trial of each block was discarded. Missed trials and incorrect trials 
were also removed from analysis, as well as trials with RT <200ms. For the conflict 
adaptation analyses, we included only trials where both previous trial and the current 
trial were correct. 
5.3.4 Time Frequency Analysis 
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Epochs were grouped according to trial congruency. EEG traces were then 
be decomposed into time-frequency charts ranging from 2-30 Hz in 15 linearly 
spaced steps of 2 Hz per bin. We then obtained the power spectrum of the EEG 
signal via the fast Fourier transform, and then multiplied that by the power spectra 
of complex Morlet wavelets with logarithmically spaced cycle sizes ranging from 3 
to 12. Using the inverse Fourier transform, we then obtained the complex signal, 
which was then converted to frequency-band specific power by squaring the result 
of the convolution of the complex and real parts of the signal. The resulting time-
frequency data was then averaged per subject and trial type. The resulting time-
frequency traces were then transformed into decibels and normalised to a baseline 
of 400ms to -100ms before stimulus onset. The above analysis was carried out in a 
fronto-central region of interest (ROI) defined by the hypothesis that conflict is 
indexed by a rise in mid-frontal theta power (for electrode positions see figure 23). 
In order to define the ROI for , we reduced the number of electrodes to four, given 
that the cluster reported in Canales-Johnson, et al (2020) was not observed under 
the original 5 electrodes. This subset of 4 electrodes was used in all subsequent 
analyses. 
In order to derive a time frequency region of interest (tf-ROI), we computed 
the overall conflict difference (i.e. incongruent-congruent) regardless of alertness or 
sleep deprivation condition, with epochs averaged per subject in each pairwise 
comparison. We used the method described by Maris & Oostenveld (2007), 
comparing subject-wise averages at corresponding time points in one-tailed 
dependent (for within-subject comparisons) or independent (for between-subject 
comparisons) sample t-tests. Adjacent temporal points whose p-values were<0.05, 
were clustered together by summating their t-values. Using the Monte Carlo method, 
this process of random partitioning and clustering was performed for 1000 
iterations. The time-frequency cluster with largest t-value was retained each time, 
constructing a histogram of multiple test statistics which was then used to determine 
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clustering threshold. A nonparametric estimate of the p-value on the resulting cluster 
was then obtained (Cohen, 2014).  
Following this step, we investigated differences between our conditions by 
extracting the time-frequency power averages from within the previously defined 
cluster. These were then analysed using a rmANOVA that contained sleep, alertness, 
and congruency as levels. A separate rmANOVA was performed to test for 
adaptation (i.e. interaction effects between current and previous congruency) given 
that we wanted to avoid the bottleneck effect on trial number that inherently arises 
from pairing trials together. 
 
5.3.5 Multivariate Spectral Decoding 
 
Recently, multivariate spectral decoding has become widely used to 
investigate differentiation between cognitive processes in the brain. In other words, 
is the information between conditions different enough to be accurately decoded by 
the classifier? 
The multivariate approach has been shown to be more specific than univariate 
methods such as the power analysis described previously (Fahrenfort et al., 2017), 
and thus might be better suited to answer general questions about stimulus 
representation across different levels of alertness.  
We used the ADAM toolbox (Fahrenfort, et al. 2018) on raw EEG data split 
by alertness level, which was transformed to time-frequency using the default 
methods with similar epoch lengths (-200ms to 1200ms, 2Hz to 30Hz). Trials were 
further split according to sound location (left-presented vs right-presented), 
semantic content (“left” vs “right”) and congruency (congruent vs incongruent). 
Given the lengthy time periods associated to decoding algorithms, data were 
downsampled to 64Hz. Time-frequency data from all scalp electrodes were then fed 
to a backward decoding algorithm, with either sound location, semantic content or 
 99 
congruency as stimulus class, applied according to a 10-fold cross-validation scheme. 
A linear discriminant analysis (LDA) was used to discriminate between our stimulus 
classes and classification accuracy was determined by measuring the area under the 
curve (AUC), as defined by signal detection theory. The AUC scores were compared 
across participants at each timepoint with double sided t-tests against a 50% chance 
level. A cluster based permutation test (p<0.05, 1000 iterations) was used to control 





5.4.1 Univariate analysis revealed a positive theta cluster associated 
to conflict 
 
Upon finding that conflict detection is not modulated by alertness, we 
expected to find the increase in oscillatory power in mid-frontal (MF) theta (4-8Hz) 
associated to conflict, thus providing further evidence for MF theta as a ubiquitous 
marker of cognitive control in line with previous findings from Jiang and colleagues 
(2015). Indeed, we observed the expected theta cluster (p=0.045, frequency range: 
3-17Hz, time-range:260-820ms) when collapsing trials within subject across 











FIGURE 22. CONFLICT EFFECT MEASURED AS INCONGRUENT MINUS CONGRUENT (I-C) 
DIFFERENCES IN DB TRANSFORMED POWER. (A) TF-ROI CLUSTER IDENTIFYING 
DIFFERENCES IN POWER ASSOCIATED WITH CONFLICT. (B) TOPOGRAPHIC SCALP MAP 





The area around the cluster described above was then used as our time 
frequency region of interest (TF-ROI) to enter into an rmANOVA, which revealed 
a main effect of alertness (F(1,24)= 3.75;  p=0.050,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.151) –albeit marginally 
significant— and congruency (F(1,24)= 47.10;  p<0.001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.662), as well as an 
interaction between alertness and congruency (F(1,24)= 9.24;  p=0.006,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.278).  
We did not observe a main effect of previous night sleep (F(1,24)= 9.258e-5;  p<0.986,  
𝜂𝑝
2 = 1.344e-5). We also did not observe a significant sleep*alertness interaction 
(F(1,24)= 0.045;  p<0.664,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.008), nor an interaction between sleep and 
congruency (F(1,24)= 0.057;  p<0.442,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.027). A post-hoc Tukey test revealed 
differences only in the awake state for both the normal sleep (t(24)=-3.49; p=0.018) 
and the sleep deprived (t(24)=-3.75 p=0.008) conditions.  
 
FIGURE 23. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN POWER ASSOCIATED TO CONFLICT. MEANS 
FROM THE TF-ROI WERE AVERAGED ACROSS TRIALS FOR EACH PARTICIPANT. POWER 
(DB) MEANS IN THE CONGRUENT TRIALS WERE SUBTRACTED FROM INCONGRUENT 
TRIALS (I-C). A POSITIVE DIFFERENCE INDICATES A CONFLICT EFFECT. 
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FIGURE 24. THETA POWER AVERAGE ACROSS SUBJECTS DERIVED FROM WITHIN TF-ROI. 
BARS SHOW SEM. 
 
5.4.2 Conflict Adaptation 
 
A subsequent rmANOVA revealed an interaction of previous congruency 
and current congruency (F(1,24)= 10.173;  p=0.004,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.298), indicating the 
presence of conflict adaptation. However, we did not find a significant interaction 
between alertness, previous trial congruency and current trial congruency (F(1,24)= 
0.006;  p=0.897,  𝜂𝑝
2 = 7.155e-4). This might suggest that even though a conflict 
adaptation effect was not observed at the level of behaviour during drowsiness, it 










FIGURE 25. ADAPTATION EFFECT BY PARTICIPANT SHOWING INDIVIDUAL POWER 
DIFFERENCES IN THE TF-ROI. ADAPTATION DIFFERENCES WERE COMPUTED BY (CI-












FIGURE 26. POWER DIFFERENCES SHOWING CONFLICT ADAPTATION INTERACTIONS FOR 
DURING NORMAL SLEEP (NS) AND SLEEP DEPRIVATION (SD). POINTS INDICATE GRAND 




5.4.3 Multivariate Spectral Decoding 
 
Given that a theta conflict effect was found to be unreliable during 
drowsiness, we reasoned that this could be due to reduced specificity in our 
univariate analysis. We therefore adopted a multivariate analysis approach using the 
ADAM decoding toolbox (Fahrenfort, et al., 2018) which  enabled us to test for 
stimuli category representations without having to define our channels, frequency 
range, or time windows a priori. It would not be surprising that a more widespread 
pattern of neural activity in time and space might underlie the conflict effect during 
drowsiness.  
In order to test for neural activation differences between our stimulus 
categories, we trained classifiers to distinguish stimuli properties from the EEG 
signal along 3 dimensions: location (i.e. left-presented vs right-presented), semantic 
content (i.e. “right” vs “left” meaning) and congruency (i.e. congruent vs 
incongruent). Above-chance classifier accuracy would imply neural processing of 
that dimension of the stimulus (Hebert and Baker, 2018).  
We identified clusters with above chance classifier accuracy across conditions 
when it came to location and semantic features (figure 27). However, stimulus 









FIGURE 27. CLASSIFIER ACCURACY ACROSS ALERTNESS AND SLEEP CONDITIONS ARE 
SHOWN FOR DIFFERENT STIMULUS FEATURES. CLASSIFIER ACCURACY WAS 
THRESHOLDED THROUGH A CLUSTER-BASED CORRECTION (P<0.05) AND SIGNIFICANT 
AUC CLUSTERS ARE SHOWN WITH INCREASED CONTRAST. SEMANTIC AND LOCATION 
INFORMATION COULD BE DECODED IN ALL CONDITIONS. BY CONTRAST, CONGRUENCY 
WAS ONLY DECODABLE DURING WAKEFULNESS AFTER NORMAL SLEEP, BUT NOT DURING 
DROWSINESS EITHER AFTER NORMAL SLEEP NOR SLEEP DEPRIVATION. CONGRUENCY 




TABLE 5. INDIVIDUAL STATISTICS FOR EACH CLUSTER IN THE MVPA ANALYSIS 
Stim Category Condition Time Range Peak Time Freq Range Peak Freq p 
Location 
NS awake 4-1200 564  2-30 2 <0.001 
NS drowsy 260-1200 644  2-24 2 <0.001 
SD awake 212-1200 580  2-30 2 <0.001 
SD drowsy 484-1200 852  2-30 12 <0.001 
Semantic 
NS awake 100-692 388  2-14 12 <0.001 
NS drowsy 148-340 276  4-8 6 0.018 
SD awake 84-532 260  2-10 4 <0.001 
SD drowsy 196-612 324  2-6  4 0.005 
Congruency 
NS awake 564-835 740  2-8 4 0.024 
NS drowsy - - - - - 
SD awake - - - - - 




5.5.1 Univariate time-frequency analysis 
 
In this chapter, we present results from a cognitive control study that 
employed a Simon task to investigate the effect of drowsiness and sleep deprivation 
on the neural signatures of conflict. Confirming our initial hypothesis and reports in 
the literature (Cohen & Donner, 2013; Helfrich & Knight, 2016; van Gaal et al., 
2012), we were able to identify an MF theta signature associated with conflict during 
wakefulness along with a wider range of frequencies. Existing studies linking theta 
to the conflict effect in the auditory domain are scarce. Therefore, this finding 
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provides further evidence of theta as a robust marker of cognitive control, regardless 
of sensory modality. 
Nonetheless, this marker was less reliable during drowsiness, likely reflective 
of wider neural changes that occur as a result of reduced alertness. It is also possible 
that the increased variability in behavior associated to drowsiness also increases 
variability in the neural signal through temporal smearing. Furthermore, null results 
from our ANOVA should be taken with caution. It is possible that a different 
statistical method such as mixed modelling might have yielded different results by 
incorporating individual differences in theta variance associated to conflict. 
After assessing univariate differences in the conflict effect, we  used a MVPA 
classifier in an attempt to shed light on patterns of neural activity resulting from 
non-linear changes associated with reduced alertness. We also attempted to further 
probe the depth of information processing of different stimulus dimensions across 
alertness levels.  
5.5.2 Multivariate spectral decoding 
In order to better characterise the cognitive fragmentation that comes with 
the descent into sleep, we trained classifiers to differentiate our stimuli across 
different dimensions using the raw EEG signal. This was intended to identify the 
level at which the loss of conflict-related neural markers was occurring. Interestingly, 
we found that the single stimulus features relevant for conflict detection (i.e. stimulus 
location and semantic content) were decodable from the EEG signal during 
alertness and –crucially— during drowsiness. However, requiring an integration of 
the two dimensions, congruency was only decodable during wakefulness in the 
normal sleep condition. Whilst we did not test this hypothesis directly, we cannot 
rule out that the difference we observe in decodability of congruency might be a 
downstream result information processes related to lower level processing of 
location and semantic information.  
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The finding that the conflict effect still behaviourally present but not 
detectable through our univariate or multivariate approaches suggests the possibility 
for secondary process that is responsible for the detection of bottom-up conflict 
which might not be available in the frequency data. Indeed, we found that conflict 
is associated with a reconfiguration of wider network theta connectivity which is 
only predictive of RT differences during drowsiness (Canales-Johnson et al., 2020). 
Gel electrodes are routinely used in overnight experiments, with duration in 
the order of 7-8 hours. The manufacturer manual for the EGI 128-eletrode 
Geodesic Sensor Net advises continuous usage for up to 12 hours. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that any of our findings are the result of any changes in impedance. 
Furthermore, electrode impedances were always checked in between the awake and 
drowsy sessions to ensure that they remained below 100 kΩ. For a discussion on 








he world is an unpredictable place. Yet we seldom take any notice of the 
unexpected circumstances that we navigate through every day, from the 
pothole on the pavement we narrowly avoid, to the effortless turning of a 
frown into a smile when we run into a friend.  The complex neural system that 
enables such behaviours is constantly operating outside our awareness, leading some 
to argue that conscious experience is merely the by-product of information 
processing in the brain.  
However implausible, the theory that consciousness has no function is 
difficult to test empirically. Yet it is possible to track cognitive changes as we 
transition from a conscious state (wakefulness) into an unconscious state (sleep) in 
the hopes that it reveals the cognitive functions that are most likely to be dependent 
on consciousness.  This thesis asks the question: to what extent are processes of 




6.1 Key findings  
 
This thesis set out to investigate the mechanisms that underlie cognitive control in 
the transition from wakefulness to sleep. We have identified that reductions in 
alertness are generally associated with slower reaction times, increased error rates 
and higher unresponsiveness. However, these key features of drowsiness are 
manifested differently depending on the cognitive task to be performed. 
In Chapter 2, we found that processes involving conflict monitoring are 
particularly impaired during drowsiness, suggesting of a specific effect of alertness 
on cognitive control. This was further supported by our finding that 
responsiveness decreases as a function of alertness. Together, these findings 
suggest that cognitive control is more susceptible than lexical decision making to 
the transition from wakefulness to sleep. 
Similarly, we revealed an effect of drowsiness on conflict adaptation but not 
conflict detection, further suggesting that alertness has a detrimental effect when 
information must be integrated across time at a global neural scale. Our neural 
findings suggest an emergence of an alternative mechanism that is not reflected on 
theta activity in midfrontal electrodes, but rather a wider theta connectivity 
increase. 
 
6.2 Alertness, responsiveness and sleep 
 
For a long time in the psychological sciences, “consciousness” was a taboo 
word, too difficult to operationalise and judged to be outside of reach to the 
scientific method. In 2003, Baars wrote: ‘psychologists avoided consciousness for 
most of the twentieth century. The central topic in psychological science became 
taboo. Those with serious interest in it risked professional suicide.’ (p. 4) 
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However, while some of the criticisms levelled against the study of 
consciousness remain to this day (remember the hard problem), enormous progress 
has been made in the last 4 decades, and the field of consciousness science is now 
thriving. This is more likely due to conceptual progress than technological 
advancements, as some of the most widely used brain recording methods in 
cognitive neuroscience were invented decades (MEG, fMRI), or even centuries ago 
(EEG).  
In the context of disorders of consciousness (DOC), Bekinschtein, et al. 
(2009) argued that disambiguating between alertness and responsiveness was 
necessary to fully characterise the spectrum of DOC’s and beyond. Under this 
framework, responsiveness refers to “the capacity of the system to respond”, while 
sensory alertness is defined as the degree to which sensory stimuli can affect the 
system, regardless of response. For the purpose of this thesis I would add that 
alertness can be conceived as a linear dimension, decreasing gradually as we 
transition from wakefulness to sleep. Notably, this definition is dissociable from 
conscious state. For instance, a dreaming person considered to be conscious, might 
be less alert than someone in dreamless N2 sleep. 
Defining alertness in such a way has a clear advantage from an information 
processing point of view: once we know sensory processing has occurred, we can 
ask what sensory processing has occurred at different levels of alertness, thus being 
able to more accurately track the neurocognitive signatures of the sleep onset period. 
Using this linear dimension, wakefulness and drowsiness can be thought of as two 
different points in the alertness spectrum.  
Under the proposed framework, alertness is also dissociable from arousal. 
Although both concepts are dependent on each other, alertness corresponds to the 
the baseline capacity of the cognitive system to be perturbed by sensory input, while 
arousal refers to the physiological/cognitive state once the system has already been 
perturbed, either by an external stimulus or intrinsic fluctuations. For instance, a 
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microarousal is typically short perturbation that happens during a period of low 
alertness, i.e. sleep. Similarly, sleep deprivation can be conceived of a state that is 
largely associated with low arousal and homeostatic pressure towards reduced 
alertness.  
6.3 Effects of alertness on cognitive processing 
 
After a long series of studies conducted in our lab and others (e.g. 
Bekinschtein, et al., 2009, Canales-Johnson, et al., 2020; Jagannathan, et al., 2018; 
Kouider, et al., 2011; Noreika, et al. 2015), we have learned to expect some 
consistent findings: 
1) Alertness fluctuates rapidly: Participants tend fluctuate in 
alertness even during short 5-7min blocks. Such fluctuations can vary on a 
trial by trial basis, and are highly variable between subject and task. 
2) RTs slow down and spread out: reaction times become slower 
and more variable during reduces levels of alertness. This is fairly constant 
among participants. 
3) Errors increase with drowsiness: as participants become drowsy, 
the proportion of errors increases. 
4) Lack of responsiveness: despite the usual increase in error rate, 
is noteworthy that rather than subjects performance becoming progressively 
worse up to the point of unresponsiveness, they seem to stop responding 
altogether. For example, errors in our conflict study did not go above 1% 
even during drowsy blocks containing a large number of unresponsive trials.  
5) Semantic information processing continues well into N1 and 
early N2: as shown in this thesis and by Canales-Johnson, et al. (2020), people 
continue to execute motor commands during N1 (Canales-Johnson, et al., 
2020), and semantic categorisation persists even after loss of motor response 
in N2 (Kouider, et al., 2015). 
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Lack of responsiveness might be adaptive, in order to avoid behaviours that 
might put an individual in danger. I.e. before behaviour becomes uncontrolled, the 
motor system shuts down to avoid negative outcomes. We have sought to expand 
the characterisation of the SOP, as proposed by Ogilvie (2001), and in turn obtain a 
clearer understanding regarding the function(s) of consciousness. 
This thesis attempts to elucidate a further key point in the understanding of 
the effects of consciousness on cognition: 
6) Alertness differentially affects cognitive processes: the general 
lesson from this thesis is that whilst reductions in alertness generally affect 
cognitive efficiency (i.e. by making them slower), it does not affect all 
processes equally. Furthermore the interactions between process and level of 
alertness can be used to determine the functional role of alert wakefulness. 
 
6.4 Alertness and conflict monitoring 
 
Our results from Chapter 2 revealed that conflict monitoring is specifically 
affected by modulations in alertness when compared to simpler perceptual decision 
processes. What is it about reduced alertness that might preserve one process better 
than the other? Even though ‘Go’ trials in both tasks were physically equivalent (i.e. 
same tones, duration, and ISI) interpreting what goes on before the button press is 
not straightforward.  
Interestingly, we did not observe any differences between tasks in awake or 
even mild drowsy levels, yet the fact that we observed differences in drowsiness 
might seem to suggest alternative explanations. For instance, it is possible that the 
decision to go left or go right gets delayed, and so when the time comes to make a 
second Go/NoGo decision, it needs to “wait” for the first decision to be made. 
However, we argue that this is unlikely to be the case, given that responses in the 
simple Go task were not found to be slower during reduced alertness. If anything 
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there was a small trend toward faster responses (most likely a chance event). This 
indicated that decisions to go left or go right gets made early during the ISI and 
therefore our effect is likely not due to a processing bottleneck. 
Another possible interpretation for our finding could be that the 
representation of the motor plan in WM is interfering with the conflict monitoring 
process, indicating that what we are seeing is indeed an interaction between WM and 
conflict monitoring mediated by alertness, rather than a simpler interaction between 
alertness and conflict monitoring. Whiles this possibility is harder to rule out, it is 
likely that the motor plan becomes locked as soon as the decision is made and 
therefore does not interfere with the subsequent performance of the task. A simple 
way to rule out this hypothesis would be to make the response criteria even simpler 
by having only one option for response (one button with left and right hand 
counterbalanced between blocks) and just having a warning cue indicating the 
upcoming Go/NoGo cue. Finding a similar effect when comparing this task to the 
Go task would provide further evidence that the effect is driven by impaired conflict 
monitoring. 
6.5 Alertness and spatial attention 
 
At their core, most integration frameworks suggest that sensory information 
is initially processed in primary sensory cortices, and stimulus features become 
progressively integrated through a bottom-up processes in other cortical areas. Thus, 
higher order stimulus features are reliant on successful processing of information at 
the bottom. Following this reasoning, detection of conflict in our auditory Simon 
task is reliant on at least 3 cognitive events:  
1. Successful processing of location 
2. Successful processing of semantic information 
3. Successful integration of location and semantic information 
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Our findings add to previous studies that suggest all these three processes are 
somewhat preserved as we enter N1 sleep, and possibly early N2 (e.g. Bareham, et 
al., 2014; Kouider, et al., 2015). However, it is possible to imagine scenarios where 
each of the processes listed above fails in turn. For instance, an early impairment in 
location processing could potentially result in improved performance, as task 
irrelevant information would not cause interference. Indeed, we found indications 
that the conflict effect during drowsiness might be driven by stimuli presented on 
the left side (Wang, 2018), who reported an interaction effect between congruency 
and stimulus location on RT and error rates.  
This is in line with previous studies from our lab which reported a rightward 
shift in attention during the SOP (Bareham, et al., 2014). Specifically, Bareham et al. 
(2014) found that stimuli presented on the left side were more likely to be 
misattributed to the right side, but only in drowsy trials (Hori stages 4-7). In the 
context of our conflict effect, we interpret this phenomenon would result in reduced 
right-sided incongruence, meaning that left-sided “right” stimuli would interfere less, 
as they would be misattributed as occurring on the right side. On the other hand, 
right-sided “left” stimuli would continue to interfere as the spatial location on this 
side of space can still be judged accurately. 
Despite the theta power interaction between alertness and congruency, it is 
clear that spatial attention is preserved enough that location information still 
interferes with semantic information, as reflected by RTs and error rates. 
Furthermore, our MVPA results directly confirm that location information is still 
processed during drowsiness. 
6.6 Semantic processing during sleep and drowsiness 
 
Sleep has often been defined as a behaviour (e.g. Ogilvie, 2001). In a view 
first articulated by Flanigan (1973), sleep was conceived purely on behavioural terms 
as long as it met 4 criteria: (a) stereotypic or species-specific posture; (b) behavioural 
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quiescence; (c) elevated behavioural threshold; and (d) rapid state reversibility with 
relatively intense stimulation.  
However, this leaves the SOP in a theoretical limbo, where it neither meets 
the criteria for sleep, nor the criteria for full wakefulness. For this reason, we prefer 
a neurocognitive definition of sleep, as defined in the introductory sections of this 
thesis. This is following a line of research that, in the last decades, has revealed even 
cognitively complex tasks can sometimes be performed during unresponsive sleep 
(for a recent review see Andrillon & Kouider, 2020). For instance, Blume, et al. 
(2017) found differential processing to salient stimuli during N1 and N2 (e..g a 
person’s own name), in what they refer to as the sentinel mod. Similarly, multiple 
studies have found semantic processing for single neutral words (Kouider, et al., 
2014; Andrillon, et al., 2016). 
This is in line with our MVPA results, which showed above chance 
classification of words by semantic identity, revealing that information processing 
still occurs during drowsiness, even after sleep deprivation. This is also supported 
by our behavioural findings, indicated by low error rates and the presence of a 
conflict effect across conditions, which is dependent on successful semantic 
processing. 
Our findings are also in line Kouider et al. (2011), who reported that not only 
can stimuli be classified according to semantic category, but motor planning could 
still be initiated during N1/2, even in unresponsive trials. Overall, our findings 
confirm that semantic processing persists for single words during early sleep. 
 
6.7 Information integration during the SOP 
 
The persistence of behavioural conflict detection effect during drowsiness 
suggests that location and semantic content continue to be integrated during 
drowsiness. However, the lack of conflict adaptation suggests an impairment of 
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integration across time. This is in line with findings suggesting preserved processing 
for auditory stimuli on shorter timescales but impaired in longer timescales of several 
seconds (Strauss, et al., 2015).  
A study by Strauss, et al (2015) compared mismatch negativity to local and 
global deviants based on Bekinschtein, et al. (2009). The task consisted of a modified 
oddball paradigm that consisted of presenting sequential tone stimuli with either 
global or local deviants. Using EEG mismatch negativity, they found auditory 
processing during N1, N2, and REM sleep for local but not for global deviants. This 
suggests that global integration is impaired during sleep.  
Our conflict adaptation findings can also be explained using the global/local 
framework, with the conflict detection effect being the result of local processing, 
and conflict adaptation requiring access to the global workspace (Dehaene and 
Changeux, 2011). When global processes become impaired during the sleep onset 
period, this results in a specific conflict adaptation impairment. 
While our finding is also possibly explained as a WM effect, we argue this is 
implausible, as holding one item for 3 seconds is considered to incur a very low WM 
load (De Fockert & Bremner, 2011). However, this possibility cannot be fully ruled 
out. 
6.8 Conflict processing across states of consciousness 
 
The first systematic studies on cognitive interference defined it in 
behavioural terms, as a function of reaction times and errors. Most famously, the 
experiments carried out by J. Ridley Stroop in 1935 investigated the effect of 
incongruent stimulus features on RTs by using different combinations of colour 
words and colour inks to produce what is now known as the Stroop task. The 
robust finding that higher RTs are reliably associated with the processing of 
incongruent stimuli became later known as the conflict effect, and has since 
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become widely studied in a wide variety of contexts ranging from addiction (Cox et 
al., 2006) to hypnosis (Raz et al., 2002). 
Notably, the conflict effect as it was originally conceived requires the 
participant to be in a responsive state in order to measure their reaction to a 
presented stimulus. However, as methods to measure and analyse brain activity 
develop, the neural underpinnings of the conflict effect have become better 
understood (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014). With a reliable neural marker for conflict, it 
would be possible to investigate it without need for a behavioural response. So 
called no-report paradigms (Tsuchiya et al., 2015) have been advantageous in the 
study of consciousness because 1) they remove confounds associated with 
response production (e.g. motor planning, self-monitoring, etc) and 2) they enable 
the study of cognitive processes during unresponsive states, such as sleep, 
disorders of consciousness, and anaesthesia.  
In a classic example of a no-report paradigm, Cruse and colleagues (2011) 
were able to detect awareness in vegetative state (VS) patients by recording brain 
activity during a motor imagery task. By decoding VS patients EEG activity, they 
were able to show that some patients had enough awareness to attend and follow 
verbal commands, as well as engage in motor imagery. While no studies have been 
conducted on conflict detection or conflict adaptation in DOCs, it would not be 
surprising that at least some VS patients would display a similar profile to that 
observed in awake healthy participants during conflict as measured by frontal theta. 
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6.9 Bottom-up vs top-down mechanisms 
 
Recently, Gevers, et al. (2015) suggested the distinction between bottom-up 
and top-down control in the context of a modified Stroop task. In order to test this 
hypothesis, they included two types of incongruent trial pairs, where the stimuli were 
either identical (e.g. ROUGE-ROUGE), or incongruent but non-identical (e.g. 
ROUGE-VERT). They found that sleep deprivation affected conflict adaptation 
only when trials were not identical, which they interpreted as a specific effect on top-
down control.  
 
FIGURE 28. EFFECTS OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION ON BOTTOM-UP AND TOP-DOWN CONFLICT 
ADAPTATION (ADAPTED FROM GEVERS, ET AL., 2015). AN ADAPTATION EFFECT IS OBSERVED 
AFTER SLEEP DEPRIVATION IN BOTTOM-UP COGNITIVE CONTROL, BUT IS ABSENT WHEN 
TOP-DOWN PROCESSING IS REQUIRED. 
 
Our conflict adaptation behavioural results look remarkably similar to their 
repetition (i.e. bottom-up) condition during wakefulness, and therefore are worth 
discussing. Given that our conflict adaptation condition did not differentiate 
between repeated and non-repeated incongruent stimuli, we cannot fully tease out 
Image redacted for copyright reasons. Copyright holder is Journal of Sleep Research. 
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the effects of bottom-up from top-down processes. The loss of conflict adaptation 
during drowsiness could mean that bottom-up cognitive control is lost during 
reduced alertness, indicating Gevers, et al. (2015) finding might be unrelated to 
changes in alertness and rather a result of another mechanism linked to sleep 
deprivation. 
The confounding of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms of control could 
also explain why we found no effect of sleep deprivation on conflict adaptation 
during wakefulness. However, an important difference between both studies is that 
in Gevers, et al. participants were totally sleep deprived for a night, while the present 
study only partially deprived participants (<4hrs). Therefore, the presence of conflict 
adaptation during sleep deprived wakefulness might also reflect a “dose-dependent” effect 
of sleep deprivation. 
6.10 Time and consciousness: back to phenomenology 
 
“The experience of temporality addresses head-on the fundamental fact that we exist only within a 
transparent web of time” 
- Francisco Varela, 1999 
 
The findings presented in this thesis are aligned with theories that suggest 
consciousness has a functional role, connecting the past (learning), present 
(behaviour), and future (the realisation of goals) into a cohesive frame of reference 
for goal-directed action (e.g. Husserl, 1964). It might be the case that the rapid and 
unstable changes in alertness that occur during the SOP result in the breakdown of 
temporality and thus limit the functional utility of consciousness: fast and flexible 
behaviour.  
6.11 Future directions 
 
In the set of studies presented, I have sought to characterise the dynamic 
cognitive processes that accompany the transition from wakefulness to sleep. 
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Furthermore, I have argued that understanding the effect of alertness on cognitive 
control might help us tell apart between the processes that require consciousness 
and those that do not. However, there are still many questions to ask.  
 
6.11.1   What about unresponsiveness? 
 
Along the introduction and discussion sections thesis, I summarised multiple 
studies that investigated brain activity during unresponsive sleep. However, in all of 
the experimental setups developed for this thesis, we sought to maximise our 
behavioural data by waking up participants whenever they stopped responding. This 
means some questions regarding information processing during deeper stages of 
sleep have been left unanswered.   
Winter (1995) hypothesised that “during light sleep, scanning of the 
environment is performed by a different system than in the awake state and that 
during drowsiness a gradual switch between these two systems takes place.” Under 
this hypothesis, we might expect that even though stimulus congruency could not 
be decoded during drowsiness using our MVPA approach, it might once again 
emerge during later stages of N1/N2 which are likely underrepresented in our 
sample.  This would be compatible with the finding from Canales-Johnson, et al. 
(2020) of an increase in long-range connectivity associated with conflict during 
drowsiness. 
 
6.11.2 Disentangling working memory from cognitive control 
 
As we covered in the discussion, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that 
our conflict adaptation effects are rather the result of WM impairments during 
drowsiness. This could be investigated by testing whether working memory interacts 
with conflict adaptation during drowsiness. Impaired conflict adaptation as a result 
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of increase working memory load would indicate that resources are shared between 
both processes.  
6.11.3 Exploring errors 
 
Trends in error rates appear to reflect a similar pattern than that observed in 
reaction times. However, given that performance was nearly at 100% accuracy, 
analysing errors under the current task is likely to exhibit a positive bias, meaning 
just a single error will make a much bigger difference than it normally would, as error 
rate variance is not being accurately measured. 
A way to circumvent this would be to make the task slightly more difficult, 
for example by introducing a time limit (at the cost of interpretability of RT data and 
potentially a large number of missed trials in the drowsy condition). A possible 
hypothesis is that participants make more errors during incongruent than congruent 
trials (i.e. a main effect of congruency) as well as more mistakes in the drowsy 
condition (a main effect of alertness). However, this might also reveal an interaction 
between congruency and alertness that was not seen in RTs, indicating a cognitive 
cost of further top-down pressures to respond on time. 
Furthermore, adding a time limit would reduce the variability in the EEG 
signal and thus make the neural activity in our drowsy trials more comparable to 
awake condition. 
6.11.4 Does sleep deprivation really have no effect on adaptation? 
 
Here, we investigated the effects of partial sleep deprivation on neurobehavioural 
markers of cognitive control. We expected to find no effects of sleep deprivation on 
conflict detection, as has been widely reported from findings in the Stroop effect (Bratzke, 
et al., 2012; Cain et al., 2011). However, informed by findings that suggested selective 
effects of deprivation in specific cognitive control subfunctions, (Gevers, et al., 2015; 
Slama, et al., 2018), we expected conflict adaptation to be impaired as a result of sleep 
deprivation.  
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The fact that we did not observe an interaction between sleep deprivation and 
conflict adaptation may be have a cognitive explanation (discussed in Section 6.8), however 
it might also be the case that our manipulation was not strong enough to impair conflict 
adaptation, and that total sleep deprivation may have yielded different results. It has indeed 
been found that the effect of sleep deprivation on sustained attention is dependent on the 
amount deprivation (Lo, et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, while the effects of acute sleep deprivation have been widely 
investigated , there is still more to understand regarding the long-term effects of chronic 
sleep deprivation.  
6.11.5 How is frontal disinhibition related to spontaneous 
imagery and creativity? 
 
To explain the trade-off between goal-oriented thinking and mind-wandering, 
Sripada (2018) has suggested an exploration/exploitation framework, where 
controlled and targeted processes of goal-orientedness are balanced against the less 
restrictive processes associated with mind-wandering in order to obtain the biggest 
environmental rewards. He proposes an ‘oscillatory strategy’ where explorative vs 
exploitative behaviour switch back and forth at the scale of minutes to seconds in 
order to provide the most optimal strategy for environmental adaptability. 
Under this framework, the SOP could be thought of as a maximally variable 
state where cognition becomes biased towards exploration, and exploitation thought 
becomes minimised, giving rise to the intense mind-wandering that results in dream-
like mentation. Inevitably, the exploration/exploitation trade-off results in goal-
directed behaviour becoming impaired. Such experiences are widely reported across 
the literature (for a review, see Nielsen, 2017) and commonly alluded to in folk 
psychology and art.  
A task where participants are asked to perform a cognitive control task could 
be complemented by prompting participants to provide a subjective report about 
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their thoughts right at the onset of unresponsiveness. The oscillatory strategy 
hypothesis would suggest that it is in this moment when mind-wandering processes 
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Appendix A. Bad trial rejection 
 
  
The figures above above show two epoched samples from different participants in our conflict task, 
although the same criteria was employed in the Go/NoGo task. Trial 899 for participant 1 and trials 





Appendix B. Sleepiness questionnaire administered to 
participants 
 
 
